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The possible emergence of  the Euro 1 as an international currency has often been underlined as 
a by-product of  European monetary unification.  This report deals with such a possibility both 
from a positive and from a normative point of  view. 
In the first section, we take a brief look at recent figures on the use of  international currencies 
in  their  various  functions.  It is  shown  that  the  dollar  today  remains  the  most  important 
international currency. Currency diversification has taken place since 1973, but at a slow pace. 
Still,  currency diversification  is  more  dynamic  for the store-of-value function than for  other 
functions, which is in line with the removal of  most restrictions in capital flows in the 1980s. 
The second section argues that the  emergence of the Euro as  an  international currency will 
depend on the pegging strategy of  third countries. Actual exchange rate policies are examined 
through the statistical and econometric analysis of short run nominal fluctuations and long run 
real evolutions. It is shown that most West-European countries are closely pegged to the DM, 
in  nominal  and  in  real terms,  while East-European countries only partially weigh the DM in 
their pegging baskets. Finally, most Asian currencies seem to be broadly pegged in nominal and 
real terms to the dollar. 
In the third section, the reason why East-European currencies may be pegged to the Euro is 
analysed.  A parallel is  drawn with the behaviour of Asian  countries vis-a-vis the yen.  After 
reviewing  some  key  statistics  on both  regions,  a  small  optimisation  model  is  proposed  to 
rationalise the choice of a real  anchor.  We conclude that the  emergence of the Euro as  an 
international anchor may be more likely (on a regional basis) than that of  the yen. Nevertheless, 
the  exchange  rate  policy  of transition  countries  as  well  as  East  Asian  countries  will  be 
dependent on the currency-denomination of capital flows,  on the evolution of the distribution 
of trade, on monetary coordination around the EMU project (in Europe) or on a multilateral 
basis (in Asia),  and on size effects.  Although a simultaneous development of the Euro and of 
the yen  would be easier because the narrowing of the dollar market would  entail  increasing 
costs in the transaction of  this currency, this scenario is not the most likely. 
The last section turns to the costs and benefits of making the Euro an international currency. 
The benefits for the EU may not be as large as there are for the US with the dollar.  A simple 
portfolio model shows that the impact of  a multipolar system on the USD volatility is unclear. 
Coordination on exchange rates will need a transformation of  the G7 framework. 
1 During the Madrid summit, in December 1995,  the word « Euro » was prefered to  « Ecu » for  calling the 
forthcoming European single currency. 
3 RESUME 
L'  accession de l  'Euro au statut de monnaie internationale a souvent ete citee comme un sous-
produit possible de !'unification monetaire.  Ce rapport etudie une telle eventualite d'un point 
de vue positif et normatif 
La premiere  partie  examine  rapidement  les  evolutions  recentes  dans  1  'usage  des  monnaies 
internationales pour chaque fonction. Une diversification monetaire a eu lieu depuis 1973, mais 
a un  rythme  lent.  La  diversification  semble  plus  dynamique  pour la  fonction  de  reserve  de 
valeur, ce qui  est coherent avec la levee presque generale des restrictions aux mouvements de 
capitaux durant les annees 1980. 
La  deuxieme  partie  defend  l'idee  selon  laquelle  l'eventuelle  emergence  de  l'Euro  comme 
monnaie internationale sera liee au  comportement de change des pays tiers.  Les politiques de 
change  de  fait  sont  examinees  a travers  une  analyse  statistique  et  econometrique  des 
fluctuations a court terme des taux de change nominaux,  et des evolutions a long terme des 
taux de change reels.  L'  etude montre que la plupart des monnaies d 'Europe de 1' Ouest sont 
ancrees sur le Deutsche mark en termes a  Ia fois nominaux et reels, alors que les pays d 'Europe 
de 1  'Est ne sui vent que partiellement Ia monnaie allemande. Entin, les pays asiatiques semblent 
en grande partie ancrer leurs monnaies sur le dollar en termes nominaux et reels. 
La troisieme partie analyse les causes des comportements de change en Europe de 1  'Est et en 
Asie.  Apres  un  examen  de  quelques  statistiques  cles,  un  modele  theorique  simple  permet 
d' interpreter les choix d' ancrage reel.  L'  etude conclut que 1  'Euro pourrait a  voir davantage de 
chances  que  le  yen  de  devenir  monnaie  d'ancrage (sur une  base  regionale).  Cependant,  les 
politiques  de  change  aussi  bien  dans  les  economies  en  transition  qu'en  Asie  du  Sud-Est 
dependront largement des monnaies dans lesquelles seront effectuees les flux  de financements 
vers ces pays,  de  I' evolution de Ia repartition geographique du  commerce,  de Ia coordination 
des pays d'Europe autour du  projet d'union monetaire et des pays d'  Asie  sur une base plus 
multilaterale, et enfin, d'  effets d' echelle. Meme si un developpement simultane de 1  'Euro et du 
yen  serait  plus  aise  (car  le  marche  du  dollar  serait  plus  rapidement  restreint),  ce  scenario 
n' apparalt pourtant pas le plus probable. 
La derniere partie est consacree a  l'etude des cofits et benefices d'une eventuelle emergence de 
l'Euro  comme  monnaie  internationale.  Les  benefices  pour l'Union  Europeenne  ne  seraient 
peut-etre pas aussi grands que ce n'est le  cas actuellement pour les Etats-Unis avec le dollar. 
En outre, un modele de portefeuille simple montre qu'un systeme multipolaire ne reduirait pas 
necessairement  la  volatilite  du  dollar.  En  tout  etat  de  cause,  le  mode  de  coordination 
international par le G7 devrait etre revu. 
4 Introduction 
Since the  breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime,  the US  dollar has  no  longer been the 
institutional key currency of  the International Monetary System. Yet, European integration and 
the  affirmation  of Japan  as  a  major  economic  and  financial  power  have  not  entailed  an 
important decline in the international use of  the US currency. The Deutsche mark as well as the 
yen  still  play  a  modest  international  role,  especially  as  means  of payment  and  as  units  of 
account.  This  study  examines  whether  the  Euro  may  become  an  important  international 
currency in the future, and whether this is a desirable evolution for Europe and for the rest of 
the world. 
Three monetary functions are usually distinguished:  means of payments, unit of account and 
store of  value. An international currency is a currency that is used by the residents of  countries 
that are not the country of  issue. 
There is an extensive, theoritical debate on whether money is useful in the general equilibrium 
framework.  In fact, interest-bearing assets should be prefered as a store of  value, and also as a 
means  of payment.  Given  that the  unit  of account function  does  not imply  holding  money, 
there is no reason why private agents should hold money. 
The  international  currency  does  not  suffer  from  this  problem,  because  holding  it  includes 
holding both money and  interest-bearing assets.  Thus,  the three traditional functions  have  a 
somewhat  different  meaning,  which  can  be  further  distinguished  according  to the  type  of 
agents using it (Table 1.1 ). 
T  bl  1 1  h  ti  f  h  .  a  e  • .  : t  e  unctiOns o  t  e mternat10na  currency_ 
Functions  Private sector  Public sector 
Means of  payments  Vehicle  Interventions 
Unit of account  Denomination  Anchor 
Store of value  Portfolio allocation  Official reserves 
Source: Krugman (1991). 
In  the past, the internationalisation of a currency has generally started with the private means 
of payments function (see Bourguinat,  1992). The first example of  an international currency is 
the Alexander's currency which was widely used in Minor Asia in  the III rd century b.c.  The 
vehicle function  was the key  determinant of the internationalisation process.  In more recent 
years,  the Bretton Woods system of fixed  exchange rates against the dollar was coupled with 
the Marshall plan which boosted the United-States as the major goods supplier ofEurope. 
Today, capital flows are forty times larger than trade flows. Thus, the most important means of 
payment function is the use of the international currency as  a vehicle in transactions between 
5 third currencies 2.  The most important determinant for this function is the size of the market. 
The larger the market,  the lower the transaction costs and  the lower some forms  of risk 3. 
What determines the size of the market for a currency? Three elements are crucial.  The first 
one  is  inertia:  the  larger  the  market  today,  the  larger  the  market  tomorrow,  because  the 
additional volume of  international transactions will likely use the existing international currency 
which already has a cost advantage. The second element is the use of  the international currency 
as a store of value, because this entails a deeper market.  The third element is the use of the 
international currency as  a unit  of account,  because it  lowers the exchange rate risk and  it 
entails the existence of official  reserves and  official interventions which broaden the market. 
Through reduced risk,  the unit-of-account function reinforces the store-of-value function.  In 
brief,  it is  now difficult to assess the hierarchy in the functions of the international currency, 
because any function has an influence on the others 4. 
Previous  studies  on the  international  use  of currencies  have  stressed  the hysteresis  of the 
internationalisation process 5.  The present international  currency takes advantage of positive 
externalities stemming from lower transaction and information costs and from network effects. 
These externalities make the emergence of a new international currency less likely.  According 
to this analysis,  the simultaneous emergence of two international currencies should be easier, 
because the size of  the existing international currency would be eroded more quickly. 
Previous studies have also reviewed the role of  the main currencies in the various functions of 
the international currency. But the unit of  account function has been largely neglected. The unit 
of  account function is generally limited to the trade-invoicing function, the debt-invoicing being 
related to the store-of-value function.  The anchoring function has been simply left aside.  Using 
a foreign currency as an anchor means keeping a stable (or crawling) exchange rate against that 
currency in nominal or real terms.  The anchoring function is crucial to understand the role of 
the  international  currency  in  every  other function,  because  it determines  the  exchange  risk 
when using the international currency 6. 
Finally,  for  the  means-of-payment  and  store-of-value  functions,  two  types  of international 
currencies should be distinguished.  When country A carries out transactions with country B, 
either  currency  A  or  currency  B  can  be  used  as  means-of-payment  or  store-of-value.  If 
currency A is systematically used, it will be considered as an international currency for country 
2 The exchange of currency i against j  is split into an exchange of i against the international currency and an 
exchange of the international currency against j. 
3 This is because a large market offers more liquidity and a larger range of instruments which better suit the 
needs for  hedging. 
4  Benassy and Deusy-Fournier (1994) underline these externalities between the three functions. 
5 See Kenen (1993), Bourguinat (1992). 
6 It is often argued that exchange rate risk is not important for both the store of  value function and the means of 
payment function,  because hedging is costless.  In fact,  only a part of the risk can be covered.  A firm cannot 
cover the exchange rate risk on its direct investment abroad, or during the delay between the computation of its 
price and the signature of a contract. 
6 (2) 
B.  But a third currency (C) can also be used. Then, currency C is an international currency for 
both countries, and it can be called a euro-currency 7. Both the European Union and Japan are 
very large economic powers, facing  a third,  large economic power:  Northern America.  This 
configuration makes unlikely the emergence of  the euro or of  the yen as euro-currencies before 
being just international currencies. More likely will be the emergence of  both currencies first as 
international currencies on a regional basis.  Such an evolution will depend on the behaviour of 
regional  partners of the EU (especially CEECs) and  of Japan (especially NICs and  ASEAN 
countries). 
In relation with the above arguments, the present report studies the possible emergence of the 
Euro  as  an  international  currency with  a special focus  on (i)  the anchoring function,  (ii)  the 
possible  emergence  of the  yen  as  a  third  international  currency  and  (iii)  the  behaviour of 
regional partners of both the EU and Japan.  Section 1 reviews some recent figures on the use 
of international currencies.  Section 2 provides empirical evidence of the use of the dollar, the 
Deutschemark and the yen  as  international anchors.  Section 3 studies the potential use of the 
Euro and of the yen as anchor currencies, on the basis of statistics on trade and capital flows, 
together  with  a  simple  optimisation  model.  The  last  section  looks  at  potential  costs  and 
benefits of  developing the Euro as an international currency. 
1. The international use of major currencies since 1974 
The international role of  the dollar has declined since 197 4,  but at a slow pace, so that the US 
currency remains the most widely used currency.  Still,  the extent of the diversification differs 
for the various functions of  an international currency. The present report focuses on the anchor 
function  which  has  not  been  stressed  in  the  literature.  This  preliminary  section  provides  an 
overview of  the evoluting use of  international currencies for the five other functions. 
1.1. The size of foreign exchange markets 
In April  1995, the dollar was still used in  83% of all  foreign exchange transactions, while the 
share of the mark and of the yen were only 37% and 24% respectively, the share of the ECU 
still  being  very  low  (Graph 1.1 ).  The  dollar  continues  to  be  more  traded  than  national 
currencies in all cities but Frankfurt. An interesting aside is that in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
the volume of  DM trade is similar to that of  yen trade (both volumes being much smaller than 
dollar trade). The turnover is dynamic for EMS currencies other than the DM: the share of  the 
French franc rose from 2% in  April  1989 to 8% in April  1995.  During the same period, the 
share of  other EMS currencies rose from 3% to 13%. 
7 The word « euro-currency » appeared in the  1960s with the « euro-dollars ».  It has nothing to do with the 
forthcoming European single currency. although a market for the « euro-euro » may emerge. 
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Graph 1.1: Currency breakdown of foreign 
exchange transactions in April 1995* 
OM  Yen  £  FF  ECU  Other  Others 
EMS 
Source: BIS, Central Bank Survey ofForeign Exchange Market Activity, May 1996. 
*Daily averages. Given that each transaction concerns two currencies, the percentages add up to twice the total amount of 
transactions (200%  ). 
1.2. Trade invoicing 
The decline of the US  dollar as a trade invoicing currency from  56% of total world trade in 
1980 to 48% in  1992 (Table 1.2) is partly due to composition effects, especially to the decline 
in  the  OPEC  countries'  share  of world  exports  (from  16%  in  1980  to  5%  in  1992). 
Nevertheless, industrial countries increasingly invoice imports in their own currency.  In other 
words, an increasing part of  world exports is invoiced in the importing country's currency. The 
only exception is Japan whose share of yen-invoiced  exports increased from 29% in  1980 to 
40% in  1992. Yet, the dollar remains the only currency used as a vehicle,  i.e.  as an invoicing 
currency  for  trade between  countries  other than  the  issuing  country.  The Deutschemark  is 
hardly used as a vehicle, even for intra-EU trade (Ecu Institute, 1995). Finally, the dollar is the 
only currency that is used in the quotations of  raw materials and energy. 
Table 1.2: Trade invoicing (% of trade invoiced in each currency) 
Main exporting countries  All countries (extrapolation) 
1980  1987  1992  1980  1987  1992 
US dollar  55  46  47  56  48  48 
OM. Guilder  16  19  17  16  19  18 
Yen  4  7  8  2  4  5 
FF, £,Lira  15  15  15  15  15  15 
Other  10  13  13  11  14  14 
Source: European CommiSSion. 
1.3. Private portfolios 
The  existing  statistics do  not allow for  a comprehensive picture of the allocation of private 
portfolios, since data on the foreign assets owned by institutions other than private banks are 
not available.  Thus this  analysis  is  limited  to the amount outstanding of international bonds 
(supply variable) and to the cross-border assets of  reporting, private banks (demand variable). 
8 The  dollar's  share  in  the  amount  outstanding  of international  bonds  declined  steadily  from 
62.3% in  1985 to 32.8% in  1995 (Graph 1.2).  This decline is  almost only due to euro-dollar 
bonds,  while the share of US  dollar bonds has  been sustained  by  Treasury bill  issues.  The 
decline in the global share of the dollar benefited mainly the yen,  whose share in non-dollar 
bonds rose from 17.7% in 1958 to 26.6o/o in  1995 (Table 1.3). Over the same period, the share 
of the DM declined.  In fact,  the DM was  almost  caught up  by  the EMS  core currencies 8, 
whose total share rose from  7o/o  in  1985 to  16.2°/o  in  1995. Starting from a very low level, the 
share of other European currencies increased over the period, while the weight of the Swiss 
franc declined from 32.5o/o in  1985 to 11.7% in  1995. 
Graph 1.2: Share of the dollar in the amount outstanding of 
international bonds (% at end-December) 
70~---------------------------------------------
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Source: BIS, monthly Report, Table 12. 
Table 1.3: Amount outstanding of international non-dollar bonds: currency breakdown (% at end-Dec.). 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995(1) 
DM  21.0  20.2  17.6  16.8  17.8  17.0  15.7 
Yen  17.7  19.7  21.6  21.5  19.2  19.3  20.0 
SF  32.5  30.7  27.9  22.6  20.6  20.1  17.2 
£  8.0  7.9  9.7  12.1  12.2  13.8  13.7 
EMS core (2)  7.0  7.7  7.3  7.4  8.1  8.6  9.7 
Li, Pta, Esc  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.7  1.6  2.4  3.4 
Other currencies  13.6  13.5  15.5  18.9  18.1  18.8  20.3 
(1) June. (2) French franc, Belgian and Lux. Franc, Dutch Gmlder, Danish Krona. 
Source: BIS, Monthly Report, Table 12. 
16.7  16.6  16.8 
20.7  22.5  24.6 
15.4  13.3  11.8 
12.0  12.8  11.8 
12.0  13.5  15.8 
3.4  3.6  3.9 
19.8  17.7  15.3 
Similarly, the dollar's share in the cross-border banking positions in foreign currencies declined 
from  75.0% in  1977, to 65.6% in  1985,  and  to 47.9% in  1995  (Table 1.4).  This movement 
benefited mainly European currencies whose share increased from  15.6% in  1977 to 18.7% in 
1985 and 29.6% in  1995.  Conversely, the share of the yen remained very low (6.1% in 1995) 
compared  to the  development  of Japanese banks,  and  given the  strong appreciation of this 
currency.  But it  should be stressed that these figures  do not include cross-border positions in 
domestic currency.  The low weight of the yen  means that the Japanese currency is little used 
8 See Footnote 2 of Table 1.3. 
9 
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13.4 for bank loans of banks situated in other countries than Japan, and that yen deposits in Japan 
by foreigners are relatively small. 
Table 1.4: Cross-border positions of banks in industrial countries, vis-a-vis all sectors: 
currency breakdown of assets in forei~  currencies (o/o  at end-December). 
US$  Yen  Pound Ster.  Other EMS* 
1977  75.0  0.3  1.1  15.6 
1978  72.9  0.8  1.2  17.1 
1979  74.0  0.6  1.2  14.7 
1980  75.3  0.9  1.2  13.0 
1981  72.1  1.7  1.5  14.9 
1982  72.4  1.6  1.3  14.7 
1983  74.0  1.7  1.2  14.6 
1984  73.5  2.1  1.4  15.0 
1985  65.6  4.0  1.9  18.7 
1986  63.0  5.1  1.9  19.0 
1987  58.4  7.0  2.2  19.5 
1988  59.0  7.1  3.1  19.8 
1989  57.5  6.7  3.6  22.1 
1990  52.8  6.7  4.4  24.9 
1991  51.6  5.9  3.8  26.4 
1992  53.3  4.5  3.4  27.5 
1993  53.3  4.4  3.0  27.9 
1994  51.2  5.2  3.2  28.4 
1995 (March)  47.9  6.1  3.2  29.6 
* Deutsche mark, French franc, Dutch guilder, Belgian franc, Italian lira and Ecu. 
Source: BIS, Monthly Report, Table 4A. 
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Attempts to summarise the currency breakdown of  the global portfolio of private agents have 
been carried out by Emerson et alii (1990) and by the Ecu Institute (1995). Their findings are 
in line with partial results presented here: according to the Ecu Institute, the share of  the dollar 
in the global portfolio declined from  67.3% in  1981  to 44.3% in  September 1993. During the 
same  period,  the  share  of EU currencies  rose from  13.2o/o  to 35.6%.  The  role  of the  yen 
increased to 8°/o  in  1993, starting from a very low level (2.2o/o in  1981 ). 
1.4. Debt invoicing 
Although  the  LDCs'  (as  well  as  the  transition  countries')  external  debt  and  the  OECD's 
external  portfolio  are  two  sides  of the  same  coin,  it  is  interesting  to  study  the  currency 
composition of LDCs' external debt because it  is  not denominated in the domestic currency. 
Thus, it might influence the choice of  an exchange rate policy in these countries. This is not the 
case in  OECD countries whose external liabilities  are denominated in  the domestic currency 
mainly. 
The LDCs' debt is highly dependent on exchange rate fluctuations because LDCs are not able 
to reallocate their liabilities when exchange rates fluctuate.  Thus,  it is  interesting to compare 
the currency breakdown of the debt at constant exchange rates.  This work was done by the 
10 BIS  in  1989  (Table 1.5).  It  shows that  except in  Africa,  the dollar's  share in  the developing 
countries' debt  vis-a-vis the industrial countries' banks declined  between  1983  to 1988.  The 
evolution is striking in Asia and in the Middle East, where the dollar's share dropped by  15%, 
using end-1988 exchange rates. In Africa, the dollar's share remained stable, but it was already 
quite low in  1983 (40%). 
This movement benefited mainly to the yen in Latin America, and over all  in Asia where the 
yen's share rose from 15% at end-1983 to 28% at end-1988. Still, these figures under-estimate 
the  share  of the yen,  since  they  do  not take into  account  the  activity  of banks  located  in 
HongK.ong and Singapore. 
Table 1.5: The share of selected currencies in the external assets of reporting banks vis-a-vis 4 regions* 
<y(  f  1 .  d  ifi d  f.  d  . 1  .  .  b  nk  d 1988  h  (  d  f  )  o o  tota  1  ent  e  assets o  m  ustna  countnes reporting  a  s, at en  - exc  ange rates  en  o  year. 
US dollar 
1983  1988 
Lat.Amer.  86.9  75.5 
Asia  67.2  52.1 
Mid.-East  65.5  50.8 
Africa  41.6  42.7 
* c:xcluding OPEC countnes. 
Source: BlS. 
Deutschemark  Yen 
1983  1988  1983  1988 
3.9  5.3  2.4  6.8 
4.2  5.1  14.6  27.7 
11.7  10.0  3.5  1.5 
3.4  3.9  2.9  3.9 
Pound Sterling  French franc  Swiss franc 
1983  1988  1983  1988  1983  1988 
1.4  2.3  2.2  2.7  1.4  1.8 
2.7  3.5  4.8  5.5  2.9  2.1 
3.5  7.7  9.0  16.2  4.1  5.4 
5.3  6.8  35.8  29.6  3.9  5.8 
Tavlas and Ozeki ( 1992) show that the weight of the yen in the total debt of five East-Asian 
countries 9  rose from 20% in  1980 to 40% in  1989 (at current exchange rates).  According to 
Touzard  (1995),  this  evolution  has  been  confirmed  in  more  recent  years  for  Indonesia, 
Tha'iland and Philippines, but not for Malaysia, where the share of  the yen in the long run debt 
fell between 1990 and 1993. China is the only Asian country whose share of  long run, external 
debt  denominated  in  yen  decreased  steadily  between  1985  and  1993.  Figures for  1993  are 
given in Section 3. 
Despite the rise  of the yen's share in  most Asian  countries,  the Japanese  currency remains 
under-represented compared to the weight of banks located in Asia in the total debt of Asian 
countries vis-a-vis reporting banks (table 1.6).  The yen's share increased between  1983  and 
1991, but the share of banks located in  Asia increased too,  and the discrepancy between the 
two figures  was  reduced  only  in  Indonesia,  Philippines,  Hong Kong and  Singapore 10.  Hong 
Kong  and  Singapore  are  special  cases  since  their  liabilities  towards foreign  banks  refer to 
interbank liabilities, for respectively 96% and 98% in  1991. The rise in the yen's share reflects 
a development of  banking activities in yen. 
9 Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippine and Thailand. 
10 In these four countries, the rise in the weight of the yen cannot be explained only by the rise of the debt vis-
a-vis banks located in Asia. Thus, some form of catching-up must have taken place, meaning either that banks 
located  in Asia  have  increasingly lent  in yen,  or that other banks  have  diversified  their  holdings  through 
lending to Asian developing countries in yen. 
11 Table 1.6: The share of the yen and of banks located in Asia in selected Asian countries' external debt 
vis-a-vis reporting banks (at current exchange rates) 
Debtor country  Share of the yen  Share of  banks in Asia  (2) - (1) 
in o/o (1)  in% (2) 
end 1983  end 1991  end 1983  end 1991  end 1983  end 1991 
China  23.5  24.2  63.0  78.5  39.5  54.3 
South Korea  5.7  12.9  45.1  56.7  39.4  43.8 
Indonesia  10.8  21.2  62.4  60.9  51.6  39.7 
Malaysia  14.8  27.0  63.4  69.3  48.6  42.3 
Philippines  10.0  16.3  56.7  42.1  46.7  25.8 
Taiwan  3.7  12.3  54.1  74.0  50.4  61.7 
Tharland  19.7  21.9  63.0  77.0  43.3  55.1 
HongKong  4.6  56.9  38.2  79.8  33.6  22.9 
Singapore  2.9  50.3  43.6  63.2  40.7  12.9 
(1) Reporting banks of  industrial countries only. (2) % of liabilities vis-a-vis banks located in Asia in the 
total debt vis-a-vis reporting banks, including off-shore centres. Under the hypothesis of  financial and 
monetary regionalism (capital flows towards Asian developing countries come from other Asian countries 
and are invoiced in the regional currency), the figures in the two columns should be equal. 
Source: BIS, august 1992. 
Conversely, the withdrawal ofNorth American banks from Latin American's external debt vis-
a-vis reporting banks since  1983  has  often been larger than,  or similar to, the corresponding 
decrease in  the dollar's share (Table I.  7).  Thus Latin American countries have simultaneously 
diversified their creditors and the currency breakdown of  their debt. 
Table 1. 7:  The share of the dollar and of banks located in North America in selected Latin American 
developing countries' external debt towards reporting banks (at current exchan2e rates) 
Debtor country  Share of the dollar  Share of  banks in North  (1)- (2) 
in o/o (1)  America, in o/o (2) 
end 1983  end 1991  end 1983  end 1991  end 1983  end 1991 
Argentina  88.3  66.4  44.1  21.4  44.2  45.0 
Brazil  89.8  71.5  35.8  22.4  54.0  49.1 
Chile  93.4  75.6  47.1  41.3  46.3  34.3 
Colombia  93.5  74.6  50.3  40.3  43.2  34.3 
Mexico  94.4  86.1  49.8  30.9  44.6  55.2 
Peru  88.6  68.8  39.6  21.9  49.0  46.9 
Uruguay  88.3  81.5  50.5  33.6  37.8  47.9 
Venezuela  93.6  76.2  41.0  19.5  52.6  56.7 
Average  91.8  76.0  43.2  26.2  48.6  49.8 
(1) Reporting banks of industrial countries only. (2)% of liabilities vis-a-vis banks located in North America 
in the total debt vis-a-vis reporting banks, excluding off-shore centres. Under the hypothesis of  financial and 
monetary regionalism (capital flows towards American developing countries come from other American 
countries and are invoiced in the regional currency), the figures in the two columns should be equal. 
Source: BIS. august 1992. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, foreign capital comes mainly from the EU, but the dollar stays 
prominent  in  the  composition  of the  long-term  debt,  except  in  Poland  and  in  the  Slovak 
Republic (see Section 3.2.2). 
12 1.5. Official reserves 
Between 1976 and  1995,  the dollar's  share in  the official reserves of the industrial countries 
declined  from  93.3%  to  63.6%  (Graph 1.3).  But this  decline  may  be  exaggerated  by  the 
dollar's depreciation, and by composition effects 11. The decline in the dollar's share benefited 
all  other currencies, but mostly the Deutschemark, whose share rose from 7.6% in  1976, to 
20.3% in  1993.  This  can be explained by  the rising  share of the European countries in  the 
official  holdings of all  the industrial  countries,  stemming from  the creation of the European 
Monetary System:  the share of European central banks (excluding the Bundesbank) abruptly 
increased from 52% at end-1978 to 62% at end-1979. 
Graph 1.3: The currency breakdown of the industrial countries' official 
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The dollar's share in  developing countries official  reserves declined between  1976 and  1980, 
but this  fall  may  be explained  by  the dollar depreciation.  Over the entire period, the dollar's 
share remained approximately constant, which means that developing countries as a whole did 
not  diversify  their  reserves  out  of the  dollar  (Graph 1. 4).  The  yen's  share  increased  at the 
expense of that of European currencies  (except the pound  sterling).  This  movement,  which 
accelerated in  1985,  can be  explained by  the yen  appreciation and by  the rise in the share of 
Asian countries' official holdings (Graph 1.5). In fact, the share of  the yen actually increased at 
a slower pace  in  Asian  reserves  than in  total world  reserves  during the  1980s (Tavlas  and 
Ozeki,  1992). But the rising weight of  Asian countries as reserve holders made the share of  the 
yen  increase.  In sum,  the change in the currency breakdown of developing countries'  official 
11  US official reserves increased from 0% of  world reserves in 1973 to 3.7% in 1994. Over the same period, the 
growth of German and Japanese official holdings has been slower than that of the total of industrial countries 
reserves. 
13 reserves since  1980 is  mainly  due to composition effects.  We shall  see in  Section 2 that this 
phenomenon can be related to the persistence of  the use of  the dollar as a nominal anchor. 
In very recent years, some Asian countries have started to diversify their official reserves (see 
Touzard,  1995  and  Roche,  1995).  In  1994,  Indonesia increased the share of the yen  in  its 
reserves from  27 to 3  5%,  while  it  reduced  the share  of the  dollar from  52  to 49%.  China 
announced its intention to allocate its reserves in equal parts between the dollar, the mark and 
the yen,  while the dollar represented 77% of official reserves at end-1994 (and 90% at end-
1993). Taiwan reduced the dollar's share from 59 to 54%. Finally,  the yen's share is  already 
predominant in the Philippines' reserves, while Malaysia does not seem to dislike having only 
25o/o of  its reserves denominated in yen. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
From  this  brief  analysis  of the  use  of currenctes,  it  ts  possible  to  conclude  that  the 
internationalisation of EU  currencies (mainly the DM) and,  to a lesser extent,  of the yen,  is 
more dynamic  for the store of value  function  than for the means of payment function.  This 
finding  is  in  line  with the quick development of capital flows  and  with the generalisation of 
portfolio diversification which was made possible by  the removal of most restrictions during 
the  1980s.  Although  financial  markets  have  developed  for  the  DM and  for  the  yen,  the 
internationalisation of both currencies seems to be limited to the store of value function.  We 
think this is not just a result of  the hysteresis of  the international status of  the dollar (more than 
20 years after the breakdown of  the Bretton Woods system!). Given the externalities between 
the various functions of  an international currency, the internationalisation of  the DM and ofthe 
yen  may  have  been  delayed  by  the  pegging  behaviour of the  monetary  authorities  in  third 
countries. This justifies a close analysis on the anchor function. 
15 2. The use of international currencies as international anchors 
2.1. Official versus de facto exchange rate regimes 
Exchange rate policies can be observed through several methods.  The most straightforward 
one is  to look at exchange rate regimes  as  listed  by  the IMF 1.  The various exchange  rate 
regimes are defined in Box 2.1.  Table 2.1  gives an insight into the evolution of the exchange 
rate regimes for IMF member countries since 1978. 
Table 2.1: The exchange rate regimes of IMF members in 1978, 1983, 1988 and 1994 (end of year). 
(number of currencies under each regime) 
Exchange rate regimes  1978  1983  1988  1994  1994 
% of  world GNP<7> 
Pegged to a currency: 
US dollar  43  34  39  25  1.53 
French franc  14  13  14  14  0.19 
Pound Sterling  4  1  0  0  0.00 
Rubble  - - - 1 (1)  0.01 
Deutschemark  0  0  0  1 (2)  0.02 
Others (3)  3  4  5  6  0.02 
Pegged to a basket of  currencies: 
SDR  15  13  8  3  0.00 
ECU < 4>  - 1  1  1  0.03 
Other baskets  21  26  30  20  1.40 
Limited  flexibility: 
European snake, European ERM  4  7  7  9  19.81 
Other pegs with narrow fluctuation bands  cf. pegging  9  4  4  0.78 
Crawling-pegs and managed  floats:  7 (5)  29  27  36  10.48 
Independently floating:  27 (6)  9  17  61  65.73 
Total  138  146  152  181  100.00 
( 1)  TaJikistan  (2)  Estonia.  (3)  South-African  Rand,  Indian  rupee,  Spanish  peseta,  Italian  lira,  Portuguese  escudo  and 
Australian dollar.< 4) Austria (1984, 1988 ), Cyprus (1994 ).  (5) Crawling-pegs only. < 6> Including managed floats. 
(?) 1993 GNP at market rates (source: World Data Bank). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, several issues. 
Since  the  breakdown  of the Bretton Woods  system,  many  countries  have  abandoned  fixed 
exchange  rate  regimes,  especially  fixed  parities  against  the  dollar  and  against  the  SDR. 
Meanwhile, crawling-pegs, managed floats and floating regimes have expanded in absolute as 
well  as in relative terms (given the increasing number of IMF members). For these countries, 
which made up to 97 currencies and 96.8% of  world GDP at end-1994, the official exchange 
rate regime gives little information about the effective exchange rate policy. 
1  IMF  Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange  Restrictions,  Annual.  Summary  table  in  the  IMF Annual 
Report. 
16 Box 2.1: Exchange Rate Regimes 
Exchange rate regimes are often classified according to  the degree of exchange rate flexibility.  In fact,  the 
crucial  point  is  not  how  much  the  exchange  rate  fluctuates,  but  whether  monetary  authorities  have  a 
commitment  concerning  exchange  rate  fluctuations:  can  the  exchange  rate  adjust  in response  to  shocks 
impacting on the economy ? 
a. Rules 
Various exchange rate regimes entail a commitment. The important criteria are: 
- whether the peg is  fixed  or moving according to  a  pre-announced schedule which depends  on inflation 
differentials that are forecasted (ex ante crawling-peg) or obseiVed (ex post  crawling-peg)~ 
- whether or not the exchange rate can fluctuate inside fixed margins around a central rate~ 
- whether the peg is defined vis-a-vis a single currency or vis-a-vis a basket of  currencies. 
Eight exchange rate regimes can be derived from these three criteria. Some examples are given below. 
E  f  h  xamp.es o  exc  ange rate commitments. 
No, or very low, flexibility  Pre-announced fluctuation margins 
Fixed peg 
- vis-a-vis a single currency  HK$/US$ (currency board)  ERM (fixed, bilateral central rates) 
- vis-a-vis a basket of currencies  Czech Koruna (adjustable)  Cyprus Pound (vis-a-vis the ECU) 
Crawling peg 
- vis-a-vis a single currency  Mexican Peso (before Dec. 1994) 
- vis-a-vis a basket of  currencies  Polish Zloty  Israel Shekel 
b. Discretion 
In the absence of  commitment, monetary authorities still have two options: 
- to let the exchange rate move according to the supply and demand of  assets (free float); 
- to inteiVene through foreign exchange reseiVes, interest rate management or foreign exchange restrictions in 
order to target some exchange rate level (a managed float).  This last regime is different from a crawling-peg 
regime since the monetary authorities can use the exchange rate to adjust to unexpected shocks to inflation or to 
the balance of  payments (discretionary policies). 
The distinction between a fixed peg and a managed float is not easy when the fixed peg is frequently adjusted, 
like in Hungary for instance. Yet, a fixed exchange rate is always adjustable, except under a currency board or 
in a  monetary  union.  Finally,  it  is  possible  to  have a  fixed,  pre-announced central  rate with discretionary 
fluctuation bands. It is the case of France, where there is a discretionary, narrow band inside the wide, +/- 15 % 
official fluctuation band. 
In  Central and  Eastern European Countries (CEECs), the choice of an exchange rate regime 
has  been  highly  dependent on the level  of foreign  exchange reserves,  and of inflation at the 
beginning  of the  transition  (see  Krzak,  1995).  After  large  initial  devaluations,  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia  and  Hungary  adopted  fixed  exchange  rates  in  order  to  provide  nominal 
anchors for price expectations (Table 2.2).  After hyperinflation was over, Poland turned to a 
crawling-peg regime in October 1991.  Czechoslovakia and Hungary, who  never experienced 
hyperinflation, stayed with adjustable peg regimes. But Hungary devalued frequently, while the 
17 Czech Republic took advantage of  a relatively low inflation rate and of  a gradual liberalisation 
of  the foreign exchange to maintain a fixed exchange rate against a basket. 
On the other hand,  Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania adopted managed floats.  In Bulgaria and 
Romania,  the  managed  float  was  not  successful  since  the  use  of the  exchange  rate  as  an 
informal anchor was inconsistent with inflationary monetary and fiscal policies. In Bulgaria, the 
real appreciation of the exchange rate led to massive speculative attacks, while Romania was 
not able to restore the convertibility except for short periods of  time. 
In brief,  official exchange rate regimes do not deliver the whole information about exchange 
rate policies.  It is  even more the case in  Asia where most regimes  are managed  floats,  i.e. 
regimes without any commitment (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: The exchange rate regimes in selected CEECs and Asian countries (end 1994). 
Czech Republic  Pegged to a basket of  the DM (65%) and the US$ (35%). 
Slovak Republic  Pegged to a basket of  the DM (65%) and the US$ (35%). 
Hungary  Adjustable peg to a basket ofDM (50%) and US$ (50o/o); frequent devaluations. 
Poland  Crawling-peg to  a basket of US$  (45%), DM (35%), £ (10°/o),  5°/o  (FF) and SF (5°/o). 
Decreasing pace of devaluation (1.4% monthly in 1994). 
Slovenia  Active. managed float. 
Bulgaria  Managed float with inefficient interventions. 
Romania  Managed float, but limited convertibility. 
Hong Kong  Pegged to the US$ 
Korea  Managed float. 
Singapore  Managed float. 
Taiwan  Not IMF member. 
Indonesia  Managed float with US$ reference. 
Malaysia  Managed float. 
Philippines  Free float. 
Thailand  Pegged to a basket. 
China  Managed float. 
India  Free float. 
Myanmar  Pegged to the SDR. 
Pakistan  Managed float. 
Sri-Lanka  Managed float. 
Sources:  Krzak  (1995);  IMF,  Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions,  1995; EBRD  Transition 
Report, 1994. 
How is it  possible to disentangle the de facto exchange rate regimes from the official regimes 
which are reported by the IMF ? Two approaches may be taken.  The first one looks at official 
reserves  as  well  as  interest  rate  management,  and  tries  to  derive  the  preferences  of the 
government. This approach was used by Popper and Lowell ( 1994) on the case of  the United-
States, Canada, Australia and Japan.  Studying official interventions assumes that interventions 
matter for the evolution of exchange rates,  which has been questioned 2.  The analysis of the 
2 On the basis of daily data,  Weber (1995) shows that most interventions are sterilised and have no lasting 
effect on the exchange rates. 
18 interest rate management does not lead to clear-cut conclusions either, given the fragility of 
estimates for the reaction function of  the monetary authorities. 
The second approach looks at the results of  the exchange rate policies, i.e.  at the variations of 
exchange  rates.  This  approach  was  initiated  by  Haldane  and  Hall  {1991)  who  analysed  the 
Sterling's transition from a dollar peg (in the mid-1970s) to a DM peg (in the late  1980s). It 
was also implemented by Frankel and Wei {1992,  1993) and Frankel (1993) who evidenced an 
increasing influence of the yen in the nominal exchange rate policies of some Asian countries 
since  the  early  1980s.  Basically,  this  method  looks at the  results of exchange rate policies, 
instead of studying the instruments (official reserves,  monetary policy).  The main problem is 
that the stability  of the exchange rate can  be  obtained without  any  will  from  the  monetary 
authorities, if  most shocks are common shocks. 
In brief,  both methods have some drawbacks.  The second one is  used in this paper.  The link 
between the short-run, nominal volatility and  the long-run,  real  fluctuations  depends  on the 
drift  of the nominal  exchange rate compared to cumulated inflation  differentials.  Pegging a 
currency to an international anchor in nominal terms leads to a real  appreciation if cumulated 
differentials are not compensated for  by  nominal  devaluations.  But in  pegging their nominal 
rate,  monetary authorities wish  that the  domestic  inflation  will  converge towards the foreign 
rate.  Hence,  nominal  and  real  pegs should be consistent in  the long run.  In the short run, the 
two pegs are consistent if the nominal exchange rate is not devalued too frequently,  or if it is 
devalued with great regularity.  In brief,  a real peg is  related to some long-run stability in the 
real exchange rate, while a nominal peg is connected to some stability in the nominal exchange 
rate over short periods. Sections 2.2 and 2.3  deal with both types of pegs for a large range of 
currencies over 1974-1993 and for a smaller range over 1974-1995. 
2.2. De  facto nominal pegs 
2. 2. 1.  The volatility of  nominal exchange rates 
Nominal exchange rate policies can be examined first  by comparing the volatility of nominal 
exchange rate variations against the USD, the DM and the yen 3.  Three currency areas can be 
derived from this analysis (see Box 2.2). 
3  The volatility is  defined as the standard deviation of the first  difference of the logarithmic exchange rate. 
With this definition, both a constant peg and a crawling peg imply a low volatility. For the choice of the sub-
periods, see below. 
19 Box 2.2: relative volatility of nominal exchange rate variations 
The nominal currency zones are defined by  measuring the standard error of  monthly variations of exchange 
rate logarithms. This volatility of each currency i is computed against each reference currency j (j = $, DM, Y). 
It is called crij· Then the relative volatility against currency j is derived in the following way: 
a  iJ  A I)  =  ---~---
(aj$ +a,y +awM) 
Currency i is supposed to be part of the j  zone if Aij  is less than 0.25. If no  Aij  is smaller than 0.25, it can be 
concluded that none  of the  three  reference  currencies  was  used  as  a  nominal  anchor  over  the  sub-period 
considered (this does not exclude an anchor based on a currency basket). 
This statistic is an adaptation of Theil's U statistic which is widely used for comparing two volatilities. The 
drawback  of this  method  is  that  it  is  not  possible  to  infer  the  significance  of volatility  gap  because  the 
distribution of the statistic is unknown.  This drawback is compensated by the use of econometric estimations 
below. 
The analysis is carried out on the monthly averages of nominal exchange rates for 112 currencies, including 16 
West-European  currencies,  4  East-European  currencies  and  15  Asian  currencies,  over  the  1974-93  period 
(1974-95 for European and Asian currencies).  Data come from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, 
and from the European Commission for the Czech Republic. 
The composition of  the three currency areas over four sub-periods is detailed in Annex 1.  The 
yen  was  never  used  as  an  anchor  currency.  The  mark  zone,  while  restricted  to  Germany, 
Belgium,  Netherlands  and  Denmark  over  the  first  sub-period  (1974-1978),  progressively 
expanded, and it covered all Western Europe over the 1989-1993 sub-period. 
For European and  Asian  currencies,  the analysis  was extended to  1995:05.  For Europe, the 
1989-1995  sub-period  was  split  into  1989:01-1992:08  and  1992:09-1995:05.  Although the 
relative volatility of most West-European currencies against the DM increased after the 1992 
EMS crisis,  only Italy and  Sweden left the DM zone over the  1992:09-1995:05  sub-period 
(Table 2.3). 
T  bl  2 3  Th  I  .  I  Tt  fW  E  .  I  h  a  e  . :  e re at1ve vo at• 1  t)' o  est- uropean, nomma  exc  ange rates smce 1989 
Against the US$ (A;,$)  Against the DM ( A;DM ) 
1989:01-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05  1989:01-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05 
Austria  0.51  0.47  0.02  0.02 
Belgium  0.50  0.41  0.04  0.14 
Denmark  0.49  0.38  0.05  0.17 
Finland  0.39  0.35  0.23  0.26 
France  0.49  0.41  0.06  0.12 
Greece  0.46  0.38  0.12  0.15 
italy  0.46  0.30  0.10  0.30 
Ireland  0.50  0.33  0.05  0.23 
Netherlands  0.51  0.47  0.02  0.02 
Portugal  0.45  0.38  0.17  0.20 
Spain  0.45  0.36  0.14  0.22 
Sweden  0.42  0.34  0.17  0.27 
UK  0.43  0.33  0.22  0.25 
Island  0.40  0.38  0.25  0.20 
Norway  0.47  0.37  0.11  0.17 
Switzerland  0.44  0.44  0.17  0.14 
Source: CEPII calculation on IFS data. 
20 East-European currencies were  not  part of any  currency area over  1989:01-1992:08.  Their 
volatility against the DM increased after the ERM crisis,  except for the Czech koruna which 
joined the DM zone after the crisis (Table 2.4). 
T  bl  2 4  Th  I  .  I  T  f  h  .  I  h  f  I  d CEEC'  a  e  :  e re at1ve vo atJ Ity o  t  e nomma  exc  ange rates o  se ecte  s  currencies smce 1989 
Against the US$ ( A;,s )  Against the DM ( A;DM) 
1989:01-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05  1989:01-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05 
Czech Rep.  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.20 
Hungary  0.32  0.23  0.34  0.45 
Poland  0.33  0.27  0.32  0.41 
Romania  0.33  0.32  0.33  0.37 
Source: CEPII calculation on IFS and EC data. 
Since 1974, the dollar zone has declined in Africa and to a lesser extent in the Middle East, but 
it has expanded in Asia where it now comprises almost all countries. Several large countries of 
Latin  America  (Brazil,  Venezuela)  temporarily  left  the  dollar  zone  in  the  1980s,  as  their 
exchange rates became highly unstable, while Mexico joined this currency zone during 1989-
1993.  Finally,  the zone without any  nominal anchor comprises a declining number of OECD 
and  Asian  currencies,  but  an  increasing  number of African  and  Middle-East currencies;  the 
behaviour  of Latin  American  currencies  being  ambiguous.  In  fact,  all  unstable  currencies, 
whose  mean  volatility  exceeded  5o/o  per  month,  belong  to  the  zone  without  any  nominal 
anchor, while the reverse is not true: several currencies without a nominal anchor remain quite 
stable (with a mean volatility less than 5%). 
T  bi  2 5  Th  I  .  I  T  f  I  dA.  .  I  h  a  e  :  e re atlve vo at• Ity o  se ecte  s1an, nomma  exc  ange rates smce 1989 
Against the US$ ( A;,s)  Against the yen ( A;,r) 
1989-1993  1994-1995(05)  1989-1993  1994-1995(05) 
Korea  0.08  0.11  0.43  0.53 
Singapore  0.18  0.11  0.39  0.56 
Indonesia  0.05  0.02  0.44  0.60 
Malaysia  0.13  0.24  0.41  0.48 
Philippines  0.20  0.19  0.39  0.46 
Thailand  0.09  0.08  0.42  0.57 
Bhutan  0.28  0.05  0.37  0.57 
China  0.24  0.34  0.34  0.34 
India  0.28  0.05  0.37  0.57 
Myanmar  0.30  0.38  0.37  0.30 
Pakistan  0.18  0.03  0.41  0.60 
Sn-Lanka  0.24  0.08  0.35  0.56 
Source: CEPII calculation on IFS data. 
Recent  years  did  not  witness  important  changes  in  the  nominal  anchoring  of the  Asian 
currencies. The crucial role of  the dollar was confirmed in  1994 and in the beginning of 1995, 
especially in southern Asia (Table 2. 5). 
The share of each currency zone in world exports is reported in Graph 2.1. It is calculated on 
the basis  of exports for  1978,  1983,  1988  and  1992.  Each of these years is  assumed to be 
21 representative of  external trade during the corresponding sub-period 4.  The share of  the dollar 
zone in  world exports has  remained  approximately stable (around 3  0%) since  1978,  OECD 
countries being replaced by Asian countries. The share of  the DM zone increased from 26% in 
1978 to 47% in 1992. This expansion can be attributed to the increasing number of  countries in 
this monetary zone, rather than to the increasing share of  the initial countries in world exports, 
as  shown in  Table 2.6.  Lastly, the share of countries without any  nominal  anchor (or with a 
basket anchor) fell from 27% in  1978 to 6% in  1992. This is due to the progressive shift of all 
Western European countries to the DM zone, to the shift of Australia to the dollar zone over 
the last sub-period, and to the rising weight of  Asian countries in world exports. 
Thus,  the  official  trend  of substituting  flexibility  for  dollar  pegs  is  not  confirmed  when 
examining effective currency zones.  On the contrary, the weight of the dollar's zone seems to 
have  been  maintained  in  terms  of world  exports,  while  the  share  of countries  without  any 
anchor has fallen to the benefit of  the DM zone. 
Graph 2.1: The share of  each nominal currency zone in 
world exports 
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2. 3. 2.  Implicit nominal baskets 
The problem with the volatility analysis is that a low volatility against the USD or the DM does 
not preclude an exchange rate policy consisting in pegging a basket of  international currencies. 
In the same way, it does not discriminate between countries without any anchor and those with 
a basket peg. Finally, it does not provide statistical tests for currency areas. 
4  Data comes from the CEPII-CHELEM data base, which does not detail all countries considered in this study. 
Nevertheless, this data cover more than 90% of world exports. 
22 (4) 
Suppose the monetary authorities want to stabilise their currency against a basket comprising 
the  USD,  European  currencies  (proxied  by  the  DM)  and  the  yen,  i.e.  they try to  limit  the 
variations in  the nominal exchange rates against three international currencies.  They minimise 
the following loss function 5: 
a(L), b(L) and c(L) are lagged polynomials 6.  Mk,;  stands for the monthly log-variation of  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  of currency  k  against  i.  cr0,cr1,cr2  are  the  corresponding  objectives 
( O"i = 0  in  case  of  a  fixed  peg;  O"i  >  0  in  case  of  a  crawling  peg).  Given  that 
ASk.DM  = ASk,$ - MvM,$  and  Mk.r = ASk,$- Mr.$, the optimal exchange rate policy is: 
ASk,$  = D + A(L)Mk,$ + B(L) ASDM,$ + C(L) ASY,$ + u 
with 
D =  a 0a(O)cr  0 +a  1b(O)cr1 + a 2c(O)cr 2 
a 0a(O):! + a 1b(0)
2 + a 2c(0)
2 
(2.2) 
A(L) =  a 0a(O)[a(O) -a(L)] 
a 0a(0)
2 + a 1b(0)
2 + a 2c(0)
2 
' 
The regression of  equation 2.2 is carried out on the monthly average of  nominal exchange rates 
for  16  West-European currencies,  4 East-European currencies and  11  Asian  curren~ies over 
197  4-199  5 7.  The behaviour of the monetary authorities may be influenced by the fluctuations 
in the USD exchange rate against the yen and the DM. Hence, four sub-periods are considered, 
which match the main turning points of  the DM/USD or yen!USD exchange rate and the ERM 
crisis of 1992. The regressions are carried out on different sub-periods for European countries 
(DM/USD and ERM turning points) and for Asian countries (yen!USD turning points). 
5 A loss function is an ordinal measure the dissatisfaction, in the same way as a utility function is an ordinal 
measure of the satisfaction. 
I  I  I 
6  a(!.) =La/  D . b(L) = L  bl  r . c(L) = L  c,  L
1  'where Lis the lag operator. 
I  U  1-0 
7  Similar regressions  were  carried out  on  Asian currencies by  Frankel and  Wei  (1992,  1993)  and Frankel 
(1993). But Frankel and Wei  (1993) defined exchange rates against the SDR while in Frankel and Wei (1992) 
and Frankel (1993). exchange rates are defined against a purchasing power over local goods on the numeraire. 
Frankel and Wei (1993) argue that under the basket-peg null hypothesis, the choice of the numeraire makes no 
difference  for  the  estimates.  But  we  shall  see  that  the  null  hypothesis  is  frequently  rejected.  Hence,  the 
numeraire matters.  Specifically, Frankel (1993) recognises that choosing the SDR as the numeraire is not the 
best solution since the SDR itself is a basket of currencies. Instead of the SDR he takes the domestic, consumer 
price  index  as  the  numeraire.  This  measure  is  intermediate between  a  nominal  exchange  rate  and a  real 
exchange rate since it takes only domestic prices into account.  Conversely, Haldane and Hall (1991) use both 
the USD and the DM as numeraires through the regression of  two equations with time-varying coefficients. 
23 Sub-period  DM/USD  Yen/USD 
1. USD depreciation  1974:01-1980:01  1974:01-1978:10 
2.  USD appreciation  1980:02-1985:02  1978:11-1985:02 
3. USD depreciation I  1985:03-1992:08  1985:03-1990:04 
4.  USD depreciation II  1992:09-1995:05  1990:05-1995:05 
The nominal peg was defined above by the short-run stability of  the nominal exchange rate, as 
opposed to the real peg which concerns long-term trends. Hence, only three lags are included 
in the regression of equation 2.2. More lags will be included for the analysis of the real pegs. 
The econometric results do not suffer from the small number of  lags since the lagged variables 
are rarely significant. 
It can be argued that the regression of equation 2.2 does not provide good estimates due to 
multicolinearity  problems.  In  a  second  step,  one  explanatory  variable  is  dropped,  and  the 
following regressions are carried out: 
For European countries:  ASk.$ = D + A(L)A.Sk,$ + B(L) ASvM.$ + u  (2.3a) 
For Asian countries:  Mk,$ = D + A(L)A.Sk,$ + C(L) A.Sr,$ + u  (2.3b) 
When significant, the «long-run» estimates of A(L) (written A(1)) always differ significantly 
from  1. In this case, the other« long-run» estimates are: 
B
- /3(1) 
(I) = 1-A(1)  and 
C(l) =  C{l) 
1-A(1) 
When A( 1)  is  not significant,  we have  B(1) =  B(1) and  C(l) = C(1) .  The « long-run » estimates 
are  computed  using  a  Wold  decomposition  (see  Annex  2).  Long run  as  well  as  short  run 
estimates (B(O) and C(O)) are reported in Annex 3. 
In  Western  Europe,  the coefficient B(O)  is  generally positive and  highly  significant.  ADM 
depreciation against the USD induces a depreciation of most European currencies against the 
USD. The pegs to the DM have been reinforced over time.  Over 1985:03-1992:08, B(O) and 
B(l)  are always significant at the 95% level.  Since  1992:09, B(O)  and/or  B(l)  have not been 
significant in Italy, in the UK and in Sweden, but B(O) has not significantly differed from unity 
at 5% in all other countries but Greece. 
Conversely,  C(O)  and  C(l)  are  rarely  significant in  Western Europe.  When significant,  C(O) 
does not exceed 0.2 (except in  Sweden over 1980:02-1985:02), while B(O)  is  never less than 
0 4.  Since  1985:03,  C(l)  has  sometimes been  negative,  which  means that the corresponding 
countries have opposed the yen appreciation. 
24 The  regression  of equation  (2.3a)  confirms  these  results.  B(O)  and  B(l)  are  significantly 
positive almost all  the time,  and they are increasingly close to unity,  except in Italy,  Sweden 
and the UK after the ERM crisis. 
It can be concluded that the Deutschemark has  become the single  nominal  anchor in  most 
West-European countries:  a  1  o/o  appreciation in  the D  M/USD exchange rate leads to a  1% 
appreciation in  most European exchange rates against the USD.  Only Greece, Italy,  Sweden 
and the UK did not peg their currencies against the DM over the last sub-period. But the role 
of  the DM as a partial anchor remained significant everywhere but in Italy. 
In the CEECs,  the DM is  used as a partial anchor.  This is  specially the case for the Czech 
Republic where B(O)  and  B(l)  are significant at  10% over 1990:05-1995:05 and the adjusted 
R2 is high over the second sub-period. Since 1992:09, Poland and Romania have also weighed 
the DM in their implicit basket pegs.  The case of Romania is  specially interesting since this 
country  officially  follows  a  floating  regime.  Nevertheless  its  B(O)  coefficient  does  not 
significantly differ  from  1 over  1992:09-1995:05  (but  B(l)  largely  exceeds  1,  which means 
that, in the« long run», Romania has over-reacted to DM/$ fluctuations). Finally, the positive 
value of  B(O) in Hungary is compensated by a negative C(O):  the fiorint has partially followed 
the DM appreciation since 1992:09, but it has opposed the yen appreciation. In fact, B(O) is no 
longer  significant  for  Hungary  in  equation  2.3a since  1992:09,  while  B(O)  becomes  highly 
significant in the three other countries. 
In brief,  whatever their official regimes, the CEECs seem to partially stabilise their currencies 
against  the  DM.  But  the  only  country  where  the  peg  to  the  DM  correctly  describes  the 
exchange rate regime is the Czech Republic. For other countries, the adjusted R2 appears quite 
low. 
In Asia,  surprisingly,  several  countries have  been  weighing  the DM in  their implicit basket 
pegs for a long time.  This is  especially the case in  Bhutan, India and Singapore.  Only China, 
Korea, Indonesia and Philippines never stabilised their exchange rates against the DM, while 
Thailand has only given a small weight to the DM since 1985 8. 
Conversely, the yen appears quite infrequently in the implicit basket pegs, and this sort of peg 
is  generally  short-lived.  Only  Singapore  weighed  the  yen  over  a  long  period  ( 1978: 11-
1995 :05). But the peg concerns only the very short run ( C(l)  is not significant), and the weight 
falls  over time:  C(O)  =  0.244 over 1978:11-1985:02, 0.126 over 1985:03-1990:04 and 0.096 
over  1990·05-1995:05.  Thailand  has  been  weighing  the  yen  since  1985:03,  but the weight 
8  B(l) is negative for Korea over 1985:03-1990:04, which means that the currency depreciated against the USD 
when the DM appreciated. This behaviour is opposite to a DM peg. 
25 remains  low (not exceeding  0.1).  Finally,  Pakistan and  Philippines  cannot be considered  as 
using the yen as a partial anchor over the last sub-period, since C(O) and  C(l) are negative. 
When equation 2.3b is regressed, C(O) and  C(l)  partially catch the previous DM effect. But the 
yen does not make for the DM, especially over the last sub-period where C(O) and  C(l)  are not 
significant for Bhutan, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, while B(O)  and/or  B(l)  were significant 
for  the corresponding countries in  equation 2.2.  Moreover,  only  Malaysia and,  to a  certain 
extent,  Korea appear to  weigh  the  yen  in  equation  2.3b  while  none  of the  estimates  was 
significant for these countries in equation 2.2 (but the adjusted R2 remain low). 
The main conclusion that emerges is the absence of a yen bloc.  In addition,  the yen  has not 
increased its role as a partial, nominal anchor in Asia since  1990.  Our results confirm those of 
Frankel an Wei ( 1993) who found « no special role for the yen » in Korea, China, Thailand and 
Singapore, except on the 1988:01-1992:08 where they found a statistically significant, but low 
coefficient on the yen in Thailand and Singapore. But in contradiction with Frankel (1993), we 
cannot conclude to an increasing role of  the yen in the region 9. 
When  B  and  C  do  not  significantly  differ  from  zero,  and  when  the  explanatory  power of 
equations 2.2  and  2.3  is  low  (it  is  often the case over the last  sub-period),  the econometric 
analysis does not allow to say whether Asian countries follow a USD peg, or whether they do 
not follow  any  peg.  But Table 2.5  shows that over the last sub-period, the volatility of the 
nominal  exchange rate against  the USD is  smaller than  Y2  of its volatility  against the yen in 
Korea,  Indonesia,  Pakistan  and  Sri  Lanka.  It  can  be  concluded  that  the  latter  countries 
followed a USD peg 10.  By contrast, Bhutan, China, India and, to a lesser extent, Philippines, 
would follow  a floating  regime ll. Finally,  only  Singapore,  Thailand  and,  to a lesser  extent, 
Malaysia,  seemed to peg their currencies to a basket of international currencies over the last 
sub-period, although the weights of  the yen and of  the DM remained low. 
In brief,  the estimates of equations 2.2  and  2.3  confirm the fact  that,  in recent years,  most 
West-European countries have pegged their currencies to the DM in nominal terms. They also 
show that the CEECs have partially stabilised their currencies against the DM, at least since 
9  Frankel  ( 1993)  uses  a  purchasing  power  over  local  goods  (the  inverse  of the  local  price  level)  as  the 
numeraire.  while  our results  are based  on  nominal  exchange rates against the  USD.  The difference  in the 
results can be due to  the choice of a numeraire. to  the samples, or to the model specification (Frankel does not 
include lags in the regressions). 
1°  For  Indonesia,  Pakistan  and  Sri  Lanka.  this  conclusion  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  the  constant  is 
significant in equations 2.2 and 2.3. 
1  1 This finding partially fits the official regimes which are a free float for India and Philippines, and a peg to 
the Indian rupee for Bhutan. 
26 1992:09. Finally,  the USD remains prominent in  the de facto exchange rate regimes of Asian 
countries. In all  countries, the rise and fall  of  the USD does not appear to have been decisive 
for the choice of  a nominal anchor. 
2.4. Real anchors 
Because the short-run volatility of  price~ is  much lower than that of nominal exchange rates, 
the short-run volatility of real exchange rates is  generally similar to that of nominal exchange 
rates. But the long run volatility of  both ~xchange rates differ since the nominal exchange rate 
can adjust in  order to stabilise the real ex;change rate.  Thus, the analysis of  real pegs must rely 
on  the  long-run  evolution  of real  exch£lnge  rates.  In  a  first  step,  the  volatility  of the  real 
exchange rates against the USD, the DM, and the yen are compared over the four sub-periods 
defined above. The methodology differs from Section 2.3 .1  in that the volatility is computed on 
I 
I 
the levels of the exchange rates instead of their variations. Thus, this analysis studies whether 
the real exchange rate is stable in the long-run, while the nominal analysis was concerned with 
the regularity of  nominal exchange rate variations. 
The problem with the volatility analysis  i~. that it  does not make any difference between noise 
and  trends.  This  problem  is  solved  in  a  second  step  through  unit-root  and  cointegration 
·• 
analysis.  But this  analysis  is  excessively restrictive since it  requires that the residuals of the 
regression be stationary, which will not be the case if some variables are omitted. Moreover, it 
I 
does  not  allow  for  a  long-run  stabilisation  of the  real  exchange  rate  against  a  basket  of 
currencies. In  a third step, the implicit basket pegs are measured through the estimation of a 
reaction function in the spirit of  2. 2 and 2. 3. 
2. 4.1.  The volatility of  real exchange rate levels 
Real  exchange  rates  are  calculated  with  monthly  output  prices 12.  Although  more  reliable, 
consumer prices do not catch the external competitiveness, because they include the prices of 
imported goods and of non-traded goods. <Conversely,  export prices are not available for most 
of  the countries under review. Output prices are available for most countries 13. 
12  Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics, ljne 63  (wholesale prices). 
13  For France. the unit labour cost is used as a proxy. 
27 Box 2.5: The relative volatility of real exchange rate levels 
Let  Ei,j be the logarithm of the bilateral real  exchange rate of currency i against currency j  (j =dollar, mark, 
yen).  The standard error of Eij represents  the  sum of the  squared discrepancies  of the  real  exchange  rate 
around  its  average  over  the  period  considered.  Thus  we  can  define  real  monetary  zones  using  the  same 
conventions as for nominal zones, i.e.  comparing relative volatilities to 0.25  (see Box 2.2).  These volatilities 
concern the  level of real  exchange  rates  while  nominal  volatilities are calculated on the basis  of nominal 
exchange  rate  variations.  The  reason  for  this  choice  is  that  we  want  to  determine  whether  the  price 
competitiveness  is  roughly  stable  over  each  sub-period,  while  the  analysis  on nominal volatility  aimed  at 
studying whether the evolution of the nominal exchange rate was regular,  i.e.  forecastable.  In Section 3,  the 
exchange  rate  policy  will  be  viewed  as  a  trade-off between  reducing  inflation  and  maintaining  external 
competitiveness. The inflation target may be related to the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation, while 
the real target is linked to the level of  the real exchange rate. 
The real currency zones based on relative volatilities are detailed in Annex 4 for the 197  4-1993 
period.  They show approximately the same evolution as the nominal zones: the yen zone has 
been limited to Japan, the mark zone has progressively attracted most European currencies, the 
dollar zone contains all Asian countries during the last sub-period, while results are ambiguous 
for Latin America.  The main differences between nominal and real  monetary zones reflect the 
trade-off between  lowering  inflation  and  maintaining  competitiveness.  Specifically,  Italy, 
Greece and  Spain  stayed  in  the  zone without  any  real  anchor over the whole  period,  while 
belonging  to  the mark nominal  zone at  least  over the  last  sub-period.  This  is  because over 
1989-93, they maintained a relatively stable nominal exchange rate against the DM, while their 
inflation rate was still higher than that of  Germany. In a similar way, Mexico left the dollar real 
zone during the last sub-period, when it entered the dollar nominal zone. The reverse occurred 
in  Venezuela, which left the dollar nominal zone in  the 1980s while staying in the dollar real 
zone. Finally, it is striking that until  1989, Northern European countries (Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) stayed in the dollar real zone but in the mark nominal zone. 
Table 2. 7:  The relative volatility of West-European currencies against the dollar and against the DM in 
real terms, since 1989. 
Against the USD  Against the DM 
1989-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05  1989-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05 
Austria  0.39  0.35  0.09  0.05 
Belgium  0.35  n.a.  0.17  n.a. 
Denmark  0.38  0.33  0.10  0.11 
Finland  0.24  0.34  0.34  0.23 
France  0.24  0.13  0.19  0.09 
Greece  0.41  0.31  0.09  0.08 
Italy  0.39  n.a.  0.12  n.a. 
Ireland  0 35  n.a.  0.17  n.a. 
Netherlands  0.42  0.36  0.04  0.03 
Spain  0.40  0.25  0.08  0.30 
Sweden  0.36  0.29  0.16  0.19 
UK  0.39  0.24  0.19  0.25 
Nonvay  0.36  0.30  0.16  0.13 
Switzerland  0.34  n.a.  0.19  n.a. 
Source: CEPII calculation on IFS data. 
28 In recent years,  the real DM zone was submitted to opposite forces  (Table 2.7).  The three 
Nordic countries joined it,  but Spain,  the UK and maybe Italy (not available) left it after the 
ERM crisis.  Finally, the three CEECs under review did not peg their currencies to the DM in 
real terms (Table 2.8), and the nine Asian countries under review remained in the USD zone in 
recent years (Table 2.9). 
Table 2.8: The relative volatility of selected Central and Eastern European currencies 
.  h  d  II  d  .  h  DM .  I  .  1989  agamst t  e  o  ar an  agamst t  e  m rea terms, smce 
Against the US$  Against the DM 
1989-1993  1990-1995(05)  1989-1993  1990-1995(05) 
Czech Rep.  n.a.  0.35  n.a.  0.38 
Hungary  0.42  n.a.  0.26  n.a. 
Poland  0.37  n.a.  0.36  n.a. 
Source: CEPII calculation on IFS and EC data. 
Table 2.9: The relative volatility of selected Asian real exchange rates against the dollar and against 
h  .  1989  t  e yen, smce 
Against the USD  Against the yen 
1989-1993  1990:05-95:05  1989-1993  1990:05-95:05 
Korea  0.14  0.12  0.45  0.55 
Singapore  0.20  0.16  0.45  0.56 
Indonesia  0.10  0.08  0.47  0.58 
Malaysia  0.22  0.25  0.31  0.39 
Philippines  0.21  0.27  0.42  0.42 
Thailand  0.19  n.a.  0.41  n.a. 
India  0.22  0.22  0.43  0.51 
Pakistan  0.12  0.21  0.48  0.49 
Sri-Lanka  0.23  0.11  0.48  0.60 
Source: author's calculation on IFS data. 
2. 4. 2.  Unit roots and cointegration 
The calculation of the relative volatilities of real exchange rates demonstrates whether the real 
exchange rate is  stable against one or another international currency, during each sub-period. 
The problem is  that it  does not discriminate between noise and trends.  In a second step, unit 
root and  cointegration analysis  is  carried  out in  order to analyse long-run relationships over 
1974-1993 14. 
The results of unit root tests are detailed in Annex 5.  Most real exchange rates appear to be 
non-stationary in level, but stationary in first difference. Only in five countries is the level of  the 
real  exchange rate stationary against the USD while  non-stationary against the DM and the 
yen  15 . This result can be interpreted as an  attempt by the monetary authorities to compensate 
for the news in order to control the evolution of  the real exchange rate against the USD in the 
long run.  Conversely, the only two cases of stationarity against the yen are that of Philippines 
14 This analysis does not include CEECs currencies for which the series are too short. 
15  The five countries are Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Argentine, Venezuela and South Mrica. 
29 and Costa-Rica. But both currencies are stationary against the yen too, which does not allow 
to conclude on the unit root analysis.  Finally,  all  European exchange rates are non-stationary 
against the USD, while some of them are stationary against the DM or the yen.  But it is  not 
possible to conclude either because the DM/yen real exchange rate is stationary too. 
When the real exchange rate is  non-stationary against the USD, there may be a cointegration 
relationship with the DM/USD or with the yen!USD  real  exchange rate (both are 1(1)  too). 
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests  were  carried  out  in  order  to  look  for  such  long-run 
relationships 16.  Few cointegration relationships show up,  the four  exceptions being  Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland for which there is  a long run relationship between the 
k/USD and the DM/USD real exchange rates, with a cointegration coefficient very close to 1 
(Annex 6).  Hence,  these four currencies were clearly pegged to the DM in  real  terms over 
197 4-93.  A  cointegration  relationship  appears  between  the  k/USD  and  the  yen/USD  real 
exchange rates for Austria, France and  Switzerland, which has little meaning since the DM/$ 
and  the  yen/$  are  cointegrated.  Finally,  no  cointegration  relationship  was  found  between 
Asian!USD and yen!USD exchange rates. 
In  brief,  the cointegration analysis  allows  to  conclude  that  five  currencies  (among  which  2 
Asian currencies) were pegged to the USD over 197 4-1993, and that five European currencies 
were pegged to the DM.  For the other currencies, the lack of long-run relationship says that 
most  currencies  were  not  pegged  to  a  single  international  currency.  But  this  analysis  is 
excessively restrictive since it requires that the residuals of the regression be stationary, which 
will  not be the case if some variables are omitted. Moreover, it  does not allow for a long-run 
stabilisation of  the real exchange rate against a basket of  currencies. 
2. 4. 3.  Implicit real basket pegs 
A less-demanding test of real exchange rate policy consists in regressing equation 2.4 in  order 
to  measure the long-run  impact  of DM/$  and  yen/$  variations  on  each  real  exchange  rate 
against the dollar: 
(2.4) 
where Ek.,i is the logarithm of  the real exchange rate of k against i,  and L is the lag operator 17. 
Equation 2.4 can be derived from the minimisation of a loss function similar to 2.1. Additional 
l6 The test consists in looking for a linear combination of both exchange rates which may be stationary. 
17 The exchange rates are first-differenciated because only their first differences are stationary.  In the case of 
Philippines and Costa Rica,  the  real  exchange rate is  stationary both against the USD  and against the yen. 
Thus,  the  following  regression  is  carried  out:  Ek,$  = F + G(L)Ek,$ + J(L)Ek,r +E.  The  long-run  estimate 
J(I) does not significantly differ from 0 at 5%, which means that both countries do  not weigh the yen in their 
implicit basket pegs. This can be shown by re-arranging the above equation as: 
30 (5) 
lags  are included here since  monetary authorities generally adjust the nominal exchange rate 
with a lag when inflation differentials accumulate if they also  have  a nominal anchor (in this 
case, adjusting the nominal exchange rate in response to inflation is costly). This leads to short-
run fluctuations in the real exchange rate that do not preclude the existence of  a real anchor. 
Following this analysis,  only long-run estimates are of interest. Like in the nominal case, they 
are estimated using a Wold decomposition (Annex 2).  The regressions are carried out over the 
1974-1993  period,  with  seasonal  dummies  18.  The  sum  of the  auto-regressive  coefficients 
(  G( 1)) is  always significantly different from one, which is  consistent with real  exchange rates 
that are stationary on first difference. This allows to interpret H(1) =  H(
1
)  and  ](1) =  J(
1
)  . 
1-G(l)  1-G(l) 
The results are striking for West-European currencies (Table 2.9).  All  of them but the Finish 
krona  exhibit  significant  il(l)  coefficients.  Moreover,  this  coefficient  does  not  significantly 
differ  from  unity  in  all  European countries but Finland,  Norway and  Sweden.  Norway and 
Sweden follow  an  implicit  real  anchor basket  containing  the  dollar  and  the Deutschemark. 
Finland follows a dollar anchor.  All the other European countries clearly peg their currencies 
to the DM in real terms. 
Table 2.9: Implicit real basket pegs (equation 2.4), 1974-1993. 
Country  G(l)  il(I)  ](I)  jf2  k{l)  Country  G(1)  H(l)  ](I) 
Austria  -0.558*  0.978**  -0.054  0.928  1  Turkey  -0.250  0.203  -.968** 
Belgium  -0.270  0.994**  0.041  0.845  0  Australia  -0.057  0.044  0.325 
Denmark  0.031  0.842**  0.003  0.892  0  Canada  0.378  0.104  -0.033 
France  0.409**  1.157**  -0.239  0.835  1  India  0.105  0.287  0.064 
Italy  0.098  0.933**  -0.189  0.739  0  Indon.  -0.221  -0.127  -0.278 
Ireland  -0.112  0.909**  0.019  0.728  0  Korea  0.256  0.088  0.148 
Spain  0.163  0.731**  -0.035  0.536  0  Singap.  0.265  0.188  -0.027 
UK  0.234  0.679**  -0.135  0.543  0  Thall  and  0.103  0.372**  -0.088 
Greece  -0.263  1.016**  -0.064  0.637  0  Brazil  -0.038  -0.367  0.573 
Finland  0.534**  0.427  0.089  0.599  0  Chile  0.417**  -0.136  0.386 
Norway  0.263  0.503**  0.026  0.773  0  Colomb.  0.718**  0.181  0.050 
Sweden  0.491 **  0.635**  0.234  0.713  0  Ecuador  -0.147  -0.523  0.301 
Switzerl.  -0.011  0.848**  0.202  0.851  0  El Salv.  -0.045  -0.562  -0.180 
Mexico  -0.088  -0.422  0.228 
* Significantly* 0 at 10%. ** Significantly* 0 at 5%. Underlined: not significantly* 1 at 5%. 
The trend is significant only in Denmark. 
Source: CEPII calculations based on IFS data. 
Ek.$ =  F + (G(L) + J(L))Ek,$- J(L)Er,$ +E. 
1  g The lags do not allow to carry out regressions on small sub-periods. 
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jf2  k {I) 
0.515  0 
0.091  0 
0.126  2 
0.145  0 
0.139  0 
0.101  0 
0.375  0 
0.098  0 
-0.016  0 
0.136  0 
0.363  0 
-0.007  0 
0.024  0 
0.099  12 The econometric results confirm the volatility analysis  for the three Nordic countries which 
definitely  did  not  peg their  currencies  in  real  terms  to the DM over  1974-1993.  But both 
methods lead to opposite results over 1974-93 for Italy, Greece and Spain which belong to the 
DM zone according to econometric results but not according to the volatility analysis.  Such 
divergent conclusions are easily explained by the devaluations that did not occur every month, 
implying  high  monthly volatility but no  long-term drift of the real  exchange rate against the 
DM. 
Other currencies do  not show significant  coefficients,  except Turkey where  1  (1)  is  negative 
and Thailand where R(l) is positive. Other countries do not weigh the DM and the yen in their 
implicit,  long run basket  pegs.  This  can be interpreted  as  a  peg  to the USD  in  Singapore, 
Colombia and Finland where the adjusted R2  is  not very low.  For other countries,  it  is  not 
possible to say whether there is a $ peg or no peg at all. 
2.5. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this  section,  statistical  and  econometric methods were used  in  order to analyse de facto 
exchange rate regimes of  a range of  currencies. Several features emerge : 
(i)  Western Europe (including  non-ERM  currencies)  already  constitutes  a  strong  monetary 
bloc that was not pulled down by the recent ERM crises.  All  countries follow a close, explicit 
or implicit nominal peg to the DM 19. Provided lagged devaluations are taken into account, the 
nominal  peg is  supplemented with a real  peg in  all  countries,  but the Nordic countries.  The 
consistency between the two pegs has been achieved both through inflation convergence and 
through correcting devaluations. 
(ii)  East European countries have  not adopted a DM nominal  peg,  although they  positively 
weigh the DM in their de facto basket peg. It is too early to conclude whether there is any real 
pegging behaviour, since the real appreciation observed in most countries is largely due to the 
initial over-devaluation, and to the desinflation process. 
(iii) The nominal volatility of  Asian currencies is smaller against the dollar than against the yen, 
and  this  feature  was  reinforced  in  recent  years.  Econometric  results  confirm  that  Asian 
countries rarely weighed the yen in their implicit basket pegs, although the peg to the USD was 
loser than for European currencies vis-a-vis the DM. 
19 The DM remains a partial nominal anchor in Italy, Greece,  Sweden and the UK. It should be reminded that 
nominal pegs include crawling pegs. 
32 3. The potential role of the Euro and the yen as international anchors 
Section 2 has shown that the Deutschemark is  already the official and/or de facto anchor for 
West-European countries, but only partially (as part of a basket) for the central and  eastern 
European countries.  With few  exceptions,  the yen  is  not used  as  an  anchor (even within  a 
basket) in Asia.  In this section the rationale for the present situation and the prospects for an 
eventual role of  the yen and of  the Euro are examined. 
For convenience,  NICs (New Industrialised  Countries) refers to the group comprising Hong 
Kong,  South Korea, Taiwan and  Singapore~ and ASEAN (Association of South Eastern Asian 
Nations) is held as the group which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
There  is  an  extensive  literature  on  the  choice  of an  exchange  rate  regime  for  Europe,  for 
developing countries and for transition countries 
1
.  Here, the flexible  exchange rate regime is 
not considered. We focus on the choice of  an anchor, i.e. on the choice between a nominal and 
a  real  anchor  (Section  3.1 ),  and  on  the  choice  of an  international  currency  as  an  anchor 
(Section 3  .2).  A simple optimisation model is  proposed in  Section 3.3  in  order to rationalise 
the choice of a foreign anchor.  Section 3.4 concludes on the potential role of the Euro and of 
the yen as international anchors. 
3.1. Nominal versus real anchor 
The choice of an  exchange  rate regime  in  LDCs  or transition countries can be viewed  as  a 
trade-off between  the  « real  target  approach »  and  the  « nominal  anchor  approach »  (see 
Carden,  1993).  In principle,  both approaches  exclude  each other.  According to the former, 
nominal  exchange rate fluctuations  can  affect the external  competitiveness,  in  the Keynesian 
tradition.  Conversely,  the  nominal  anchor  approach stipulates  that  a nominal  exchange  rate 
policy can help reducing inflation without any lasting effect on real variables, in the monetarist 
tradition. In practice, countries which peg their nominal exchange rate wish that their inflation 
rate will converge towards the inflation in the anchor country. In the mid-time, they allow for a 
real  appreciation  that  helps  reducing  inflation  at  the  expense  of external  competitiveness. 
Discretionary or pre-announced devaluations help  reconciling the nominal  objective with the 
real target during the disinflation process. 
1  See Argy (1990). Corden (1993). Kwan (1994). 
33 In  the  short  run,  a nominal  anchor is  still  consistent with  a real  anchor if the traded goods 
sector is large and if it is price-taker (Box 3.1 ).  If  the non-traded goods sector is large, then a 
nominal anchor leads to a real appreciation in a country with some internal inflation. Finally, a 
real  anchor  means  that the  nominal  exchange  rate  depreciates  in  order to  compensate  for 
internal inflation. Internal inflation can be magnified if  the rise in the price of  imported goods is 
passed on the non-traded goods sector. 
Considering that the countries under review are broadly price-takers,  the choice between a 
nominal and a real anchor emerges only if there is  a large sector of non-traded goods. In this 
case, the optimal exchange rate policy will depend on the size of  the non-traded goods sector, 
on the inflationary  consequences  of a  depreciation,  and  on  the  policy  preferences between 
external competitiveness and inflation. 
Box 3.1 : nominal versus real anchor 
Suppose  there  are  two  sectors  in  the  economy.  The  inflation  rate  p  depends  on the variations of both the 
tradable and non-tradable prices (pr and PN): 
The inflation of tradable goods depends on the variations in the nominal exchange rate e and on the variation 
of non-traded goods prices: 
If the country if price-taker, we have-r= 1. If  it is price-maker, we have-r= O.The inflation of non-traded goods 
depends on the evolution of  the nominal exchange rate and on exogenous shocks E: 
PN =  ve + e,  0 ~  v ~  1 
Finally, the variation in the external competitiveness of traded goods is defined with constant foreign prices: 
TC r  = e- Pr 
The variation in the real exchange rate is: 
Jr=e-p 
p. nr and n can be re-written as functions of e and E: 
p = (17r(l- v) + v)e + (1-l]r)e 
7r r  = (  1  - r )(  (1- v )e - e) 
Jr = (1- 17r)( (1- v)e- e) 
34 1st case: the currency is pegged in nominal terms (e =  0) 
We have: 
l 
p = ( 1  - 1]T )c 
Jr r  = - (1 - ')c 
Jr = -(l-7]T)& 
Shocks on the internal inflation e are passed on the inflation rate p,  worsening the external competitiveness 
"rand appreciating the real  exchange  rate  1t. If  the country  is  price-taker ('t = 1),  the nominal anchor is 
consistent with  a constant competitiveness.  But  the  real  exchange rate  still appreciates,  except if  the traded 
goods sector is very large ( 1] ~  1  ).  Conversely, if the country is price-maker ('t = 0), a nominal anchor means 
that the  internal inflation is not stabilised, leading to  a real  appreciation and deteriorating competitiveness, 
whatever be the relative size of the traded-goods sector. 
2nd case: the currency is pegged in real term (H= 0) 
We have: 
l
p = e = c I (1- v) 
7r T  =  Q 
;r=O 
The nominal exchange rate depreciates in order to meet the internal inflation, but the depreciation exacerbates 
inflation. Thus. unless v = 0. the nominal depreciation must exceed the internal inflation. 
The  Asian  countries  and  the  CEECs  are  in  very  different  situations  vis-a-vis the trade-off 
between external competitiveness and inflation (Table 3.1 ). 
In 1995, all Asian countries under review experienced moderate inflation.  The current account 
was still in deficit in the ASEAN countries who needed to import foreign capitals, while NICs 
run external surpluses (except Korea).  Thus,  ASEAN countries,  which both need to attrack 
foreign direct investment and to increase their exports, will likely oppose any appreciation in 
their real exchange rate, while NICs may accept a real appreciation as an increase in their living 
standards consistent with their growing external position. 
Conversely, the CEECs tried to solve the trade-off between a real target and a nominal target 
by  an  initial,  large  devaluation  followed  by  a  fixed  nominal  exchange  rate.  The  initial 
devaluation  was designed to leave  room for  real  appreciation during the disinflation process. 
The risk was that initial underevaluation could bring some inflation. 
35 Table 3.1: Some macroeconomic indicators in selected countries. 
CPI inflation  Current  Export/GDP 
%in 1995  account  ratio,% in 
(1)  % GDP, 1995  1993 
(1)  (2) 
Czech Rep.  9.1  -3.3  22.6 (Czechosl.) 
Poland  27.8  2.9  13.3 
Slovak Rep  9.9  5 (*)  n.a. 
Slovenia  12.1  3 (*)  n.a. 
Bulgaria  62.1  -2n  18.7 
Croatia  2.1  2 (*)  n.a. 
Hungary  28.2  -5.5  18.3 
Maccdoma  16.1  -10 (*)  n.a. 
Romania  32.3  -1 \*)  12.0 
Estonia  28.9  -6n  n.a. 
Latvia  25.0  -3 (*)  n.a. 
Lithuania  36.5  -4 (*)  n.a. 
Hong Kong  9.0  n.a.  26.1 
Korea  4.5  -2.0  24.9 
Singapore  1.7  18.3  84.3 
Taiwan  3.7  1.6  38.6 
Indonesia  9.4  -3.7  25.7 
Malaysia  3.4  -8.5  71.4 
Philippines  8.1  -3.3  21.7 
Thailand  5.8  -7.1  27.3 
Bhutan  8.0  n.a.  n.a. 
China  14.8  2.3  19.1 
India  10.2  -1.5  8.8 
Pakistan  12.3  -3.8  12.8 
Sri Lanka  7.7  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources:  (1) IMF, World Economic Outlook, may 1996 and may 1995; 
(2) CEPII-CHELEM data base, 1995. 
(3) World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1994-95 
(*) 1994 
Net external  Long-term debt 
debt, % of  GNP  setvice, % of 
1993 (3)  GDP, 1993 (3) 
28  3.9 
53  1.6 
31  5.3 
26  n.a. 
161  2.3 
21  n.a. 
70  11.7 
32  0.5 
19  0.9 
7  0.4 
-3  0.1 
8  0.0 
n.a.  n.a. 
14.4  2.5 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
65.9  8.6 
37.8  6.1 
63.7  8.3 
37.6  6.5 
36.4  2.8 
21.4  2.2 
37.3  3.2 
49.7  6.1 
65.5  3.6 
Due  to  a  lack  of reserves  or of international  support,  not  all  countries  chose a  fixed  peg. 
Wyplosz ( 1995) confirms the fact that the adoption of  fixed exchange rates at the time of  price 
liberalisation  helped  contain  the  initial  burst  of inflation.  But  he  notes  that  an  alternative 
explanation  is  that  the  initial  level  of inflation  influenced  the  choice  of the  exchange  rate 
regime.  After the initial liberalisation, inflation was slightly better controlled in fixed  exchange 
rate  regimes  than  in  floating  regimes.  Among  the  «fixers»,  the  preference  for  nominal 
stabilisation was compensated by  increasing deficits over the first  four years.  Conversely, the 
« floaters »  experienced  sudden  deficits  due  to  insufficient  initial  real  depreciation,  but 
afterwards they turned to quasi-equilibrium. 
Still in  1995, most transition countries under review experienced double-digit inflation.  Four 
groups of  countries should be distinguished: 
- The Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia engaged in early stabilisation, 
and  have  been quite successful  in  reducing inflation and  restoring growth (although Slovenia 
36 chose a floating regime).  Their fiscal  and  external accounts are close to balance, and they are 
only  moderately indebted.  Finally,  these countries are candidates to join the E.U., which may 
biase there exchange rate policy towards nominal fixity. 
- Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Hungary,  Macedonia  and  Romania  either  started  stabilisation  quite 
recently,  or were rather unsuccessful  (Hungary).  Except Croatia, they still  suffer from high 
inflation  rates.  This  is  accompanied  by  large fiscal  deficits  (Bulgaria,  Hungary)  or external 
deficits (Hungary, Macedonia). Bulgaria and Hungary suffer from a large external debt ratio. 
Still, positive growth has been restored in all countries but Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
- Finally,  the  Baltic  countries  are  intermediate  cases,  with  positive  growth,  double-digit 
inflation rates (although two of  them have currency boards), fiscal and foreign account deficits, 
but very low debt ratios. 
In  brief,  there still  is  a rationale for  transition  countries to favour the nominal target,  except 
maybe for Hungary, Macedonia and Estonia who run large external deficits. Conversely, Asian 
countries which  have  reached  single-digit  inflation  rates may  be  more aware of the external 
account. This would entail preserving external competitiveness (ASEAN countries) or allowing 
for real appreciation (NICs) 
2
. 
It may  be asked whether a constant real  exchange rate is  a good proxy for  the real  target. 
There  should  be  a  long  run  trend  of the  real  exchange  rate  to  appreciate  in  catching  up 
countries (Balassa effect). In this view, public authorities should follow a« crawling real peg», 
defined on the basis of productivity growth. This type of real exchange rate policy was taken 
into account in the unit root tests of Section 2,  where most real exchange rates were found to 
be  non-stationary.  However,  the  current  account  is  not  just  a  question  of  external 
competitiveness,  when  there  is  an  external  debt  denominated  in  foreign  currencies:  a 
depreciation  in  real  terms  improves  the  trade  account  if the  Marshall-Lerner  condition  Is 
verified,  but the external debt is  revalued.  The net effect on the current account is  uncertain. 
With a 1  0% debt service/GDP ratio, a 10% depreciation against the currency of denomination 
induces  a  rise  in  the  debt  service  ratio  by  1  percentage  point 
3
.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
depreciation  of the  currency  raises  external  competitiveness.  With  an  export/GNP  ratio  of 
25o/o,  the net effect of a depreciation on the current account is positive if the sum of the price 
2 In fact, NICs have fighted real appreciation by official interventions, which were sterilised in order to preserve 
low inflation through low monetary growth (see Benaroya and Janci, 1995). 
3  In theory,  indebted  countries  should  be  indifferent to  the  currency of denomination of their debt  if the 
uncovered interest parity (UIP)  holds, because any change in the exchange rate should be compensated by an 
interest differential. In fact,  asset holders are risk-adverse, and the UIP does not hold.  In practice, exchange 
rates  are  much  more  volatile  than interest  rates,  and  the  cost  of the external  debt  is  more  dependent  on 
valuation effects than on interest rates differentials. 
37 elasticities of exports and imports exceeds 1.4 (instead of 1 if there is no external debt). Thus, 
the net effect of a currency depreciation on  the balance of payments is  ambiguous in  a highly 
indebted country 
4
. 
3.2. Choosing a foreign anchor 
Assuming that the countries under review wish to stabilise their real exchange rates, they still 
have to choose between various foreign anchors. Following the above analysis, the choice of  a 
foreign anchor depends on the country and currency breakdown of  trade and capital flows. 
3.2.1. Asia 
a.  Trade flows 
The breakdown of  Asian external trade by country is detailed in Box 3.2 for 1973 and 1993. 
For the NICs, the US  market is  not as  important as  it  used to be,  while Asian markets are 
developing. On the import side,  Asian countries, including Japan, are larger suppliers than the 
US, even though the latter represents 20-21% of  imports in Korea and Taiwan. 
The US remains an important market for the ASEAN countries (especially for Philippines), but 
an  increasing  share of exports  is  directed  to the NICs.  The US  is  not the main  exporting 
country  both  for  Indonesia  and  Malaysia  (but  these  two  countries  remain  dollar-oriented 
because they are oil-exporters). 
Lastly, the external trade of  India and Pakistan is EC-oriented. Chinese exports are diversified, 
while its imports come mainly from Asia. 
Kwan (1994) makes  a clear distinction between the NICs which  mainly  compete in  the US 
market  and  ASEAN  countries,  which  have  Japan  as  their  main  partner  for  imports.  The 
analysis here shows that this distinction, while quite impressive in  1973, is now vanishing due 
to two trends:  (i)  intra-NICs trade is  developing at the expense of exports to the US  and to 
Japan, and (ii) NICs have also become major suppliers for ASEAN countries, at the expense of 
Japan 
5
. 
4  In  principle, the trade balance is influenced by  the real exchange rate, while re-evaluation effects are due to 
variations in the nominal exchange rate.  But a developing country considers the world inflation as exogenous. 
The evolution of its  real  exchange rate basically depends on that of its nominal exchange rate compared to 
domestic  inflation.  While  the external  debt  is  influenced by  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  the  nominal  GDP 
depends on the domestic inflation. Hence, the debt ratio rises when the real exchange rate depreciates. 
5 Singapore is the only NIC whose exports to the US have expanded faster than its total exports, while Malaysia 
is the only ASEAN country whose imports from Japan have expanded faster than its total imports. 
38 (6) 
Box 3.2: Asian external trade 
Orientation of exports by selected Asian countries (o/o of total exports of each country). 
Exporting  To the US  To Japan  To NICs  ToASEAN  TotheEU15  Elsewhere 
country  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993 
Japan  27.7  29.4  - - 13.5  19.1  7.4  9.2  14.3  16.2  37.1  26.1 
Hong Kong  35.3  22.5  5.7  4.0  5.0  8.9  2.7  3.7  32.6  21.6  18.7  39.3 
Korea  33.6  21.3  37.8  14.3  5.7  11.1  2.0  7.7  10.7  12.1  10.2  33.5 
Singapore  16.6  21.9  10.3  7.0  9.2  15.6  22.4  23.4  16.2  14.5  25.3  17.6 
·~ai'wan  42.1  28.3  14.8  11.2  9.4  9.9  4.1  7.1  13.0  15.3  16.6  28.2 
Indonesia  12.1  13.0  56.3  31.7  14.9  21.1  1.1  3.9  11.5  14.8  4.1  15.5 
Malaysia  13.3  21.0  29.7  15.5  16.1  29.4  1.4  5.5  23.0  14.9  16.5  13.7 
Philippines  35.2  38.2  40.4  18.9  4.7  12.2  1.2  3.5  13.0  16.4  5.5  10.8 
Thailand  10.7  22.2  28.3  17.9  14.8  15.5  12.1  4.3  19.4  18.9  14.7  21.2 
China  1.4  29.0  20.1  19.8  19.3  9.0  1.1  3.2  13.8  20.5  44.3  18.5 
India  13.7  18.0  16.7  9.1  2.1  7.6  1.4  5.1  24.7  29.1  41.4  31.1 
Pakistan  11.9  13.4  15.9  7.7  15.3  10.8  3.9  3.5  23.9  31.6  29.1  33.0 
Source: CEPII-CHELEM data base. 
Origin of imports of selected Asian countries (%, of total imports of each country). 
Importing  From the US  From Japan  From NICs  FromASEAN  From the EU15  Elsewhere 
country  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993  1973  1993 
Japan  24.6  22.1  - - 6.5  11.8  12.1  12.3  9.2  13.8  47.6  40.0 
Hong Kong  13.4  9.1  21.1  18.7  10.3  23.3  3.3  6.0  18.7  22.0  33.2  20.9 
Korea  27.2  19.3  13.0  26.0  1.8  4.4  8.1  6.6  7.2  13.7  42.7  30.0 
Singapore  15.5  14.3  20.6  22.6  5.9  9.6  17.1  21.5  15.9  13.1  25.0  18.9 
Taiwan  22.4  20.5  38.8  32.8  4.4  7.3  4.5  6.3  13.9  14.5  16.0  18.6 
Indonesia  17.4  10.8  36.5  23.6  9.4  20.5  2.6  3.0  20.5  21.6  13.6  20.5 
Malaysia  8.2  16.0  22.1  26.7  13.9  26.1  7.7  5.3  22.0  14.1  26.1  11.8 
Philippines  26.9  19.3  33.7  27.2  4.2  17.3  1.5  5.0  13.3  12.6  21.5  18.6 
Thailand  13.1  9.1  38.3  31.2  8.1  17.2  1.3  5.7  20.4  16.6  18.8  20.2 
China  11.8  11.6  20.3  26.7  3.7  27.7  1.7  3.1  16.3  14.5  44.2  16.4 
India  16.5  11.3  10.5  6.5  0.9  11.0  1.0  1.9  29.4  31.3  41.7  38.0 
Pakistan  29.8  8.6  13.3  15.0  1.7  8.3  0.8  6.8  26.2  27.6  28.2  33.7 
Source: CEPII-CHELEM data base. 
Share of oil in the external trade of selected Asian countries 
Importing country  o/o of  total imports  Exporting country  % of  total exports 
South Korea  11.7  Indonesia  15.5 
Singapore  10.0  Malaysia  9.0 
Philippines  10.2 
India  15.8 
Source: CEPII-CHELEM data base. 
It has  become a conventional wisdom to say  that,  unlike Europe,  Asia is  not a trade bloc. 
Maswood (1994)  argues that  such  a bloc  should  include Japan.  Yet Japan's trade intensity 
index declined between 1980 and 1991  for East Asia, while it increased for the United States 
6
. 
6 The trade intensity index is defined as the ratio of  country i exports to j (Xij) to the total of country i 's exports 
XIX 
(XI ).  divided by  the  ratio of target country imports (X.j) to  total  world imports (X  .. ):  TJJ.  =  IJ  I . •  Thus, 
I)  X ./X 
.J  . 
the bilateral trade is corrected for the share of  each country in the world trade. 
39 The rising share of the Asian countries in  total Japanese exports was more than explained by 
the dynamism of Asian  countries as  importing countries.  In  a similar way,  Frankel and  Wei 
(1993) and  Frankel  (1993)  estimate a gravitational model of trade.  They test whether trade 
bloc dummies are significant in explaining trade flows, even when the distance or the openness 
are  included  in  the  regressions.  They  conclude  that  unlike  Europe  and  the  Western 
Hemisphere, Pacific and East Asian blocs seem to have weakened in the 1980s. The expansion 
of trade  in  these  two  blocs  was  simply  in  line  with  their  economic  development,  their 
geographic proximity and their opening trend. But it  is  not important here to know whether 
intra-Asia trade expansion was due or not to a specific trade bloc effect. The important thing is 
that (i) there is a trade dynamism between non-Japan, Asian countries, (ii) the role of  Asia as a 
trading partner is growing for Japan, and (iii) the role of  Japan as a trading partner is declining 
for most of  the other Asian countries. 
b.  Capital flows 
Capital flows between Asian countries are well described in Kwan (1994). Traditionally, Japan 
was  running  a  trade  deficit  with  the  ASEAN  countries  because  of large  oil  imports  from 
Indonesia and Malaysia. But in recent years, the large flow of direct investment from Japan to 
the ASEAN countries has stimulated Japanese exports of investment goods.  The trade deficit 
turned into surplus in  1992.  The Asian NICs also  provide foreign investment to the ASEAN 
countries (Taiwan is running a surplus vis-a-vis the ASEAN countries). 
There is a long tradition of  trade surpluses of Japan vis-a-vis the Asian NICs, and this surplus 
has increased in recent years.  As a whole, in  1994, the surplus of Japan vis-a-vis Asia was of 
$63  bn while its surplus vis-a-vis the US  was of $61  bn 
7
. But Japanese investment in ASEAN 
countries is  being caught up  by the NICs,  which  are increasingly investing in  the region.  In 
fact,  every stage of the balance of payment cycle is represented in Asia.  Thus, there are good 
grounds for further development of  capital flows between Asian countries. 
The role of  Japan as a direct investor in Asia has been widely documented. In 1994, the stock 
of direct  investment  of Japan  in  Asia  was  $51  bn,  while  that of the  US  amounted  only  to 
$46 bn 
8
. However, Japanese direct investments to the NICs have been decreasing since  1989, 
while those to  A  SEAN countries have increased steadily since  1986 (see MITI,  1994  ).  NICs 
have also begun to  invest  massively  in  ASEAN countries,  and  the stock of direct investment 
amounted to $88 bn in 1994 (see Footnote 8). 
The role of banks located in Japan is  shown in Table 3.2.  The share of Japan as a creditor is 
always  much larger than that of the United  States,  except in  Thailand.  Pakistan is  a second 
7 Source: CEPII-CHELEM data base. 
8 Source: CEPII calculations based on World Investment Report, Survey of  Current Business and MIT! data. In 
fact, Asia is not the main destination of Japanese direct investments (on this point, see De Laubier, 1995). 
40 exception,  with  credits  coming  mainly  from  Europe.  Finally,  the  yen  is  already  the  major 
currency for long-run debts in the ASEAN countries (Table 3 .3). 
Table 3.2: International bank liabilities by creditor country, at end-1994 (0/o of total external bank debt) 
United States  Jap_an  United States  Japan 
South Korea  9.7  30.9  Indonesia  7.2  53.7 
Taiwan  12.1  25.7  Malaysia  10.2  43.3 
China  2.3  34.5  Philippines  14.7  39.3 
India  8.1  28.7  Thailand  61.0  6.2 
Pakistan  6.0  7.8  .. 
Source: BIS, Ventilation par Echeance, Secteur et Nationa/ite des Prets Bancaires Internationaux, JUillet 1995. 
Table 3.3: Currency composition of the long-term debt in selected Asian countries in 1993 
US dollar  Yen  Multiple  US dollar  Yen  Multiple 
currency  currency 
China  54.2  21.0  20.6  Indonesia  13.2  40.7  30.6 
India  55.0  12.8  14.6  Malaysia  25.1  37.5  21.8 
Pakistan  34.5  14.2  32.4  Philippines  30.2  38.3  25.3 
Sri Lanka  36.4  27.4  18.1  Thailand  21.8  52.1  18.6 
Source: The World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1994-95. 
To summarise, three stylised facts emerge from the above analysis of  the Asian economies: 
- First, there is an intra-regional trade dynamism among Asian countries other than Japan. Asia 
as a whole has also become a major partner for Japan, also the reverse is not true: the role of 
Japan as a trade partner has diminished for Asian countries since 1973. 
- Secondly, Japan is the main foreign investor in Asia, although Asia is not the main destination 
for  Japanese direct investments.  The NICs play  an  increasing  role  in  financing  the ASEAN 
countries. 
-Finally, the yen already plays a major role in the external debt of  Asian countries. This feature 
is likely to be important for the exchange rate policy in countries which have a large debt/GNP 
ratio, i.e. in Indonesia and Philippines. 
Given  the  increasing  weight  of the  yen-denominated  debt,  and  the  development  of intra-
regional flows of trade and capital, there should be an rising incentive for Asian countries to 
use the yen instead of  the US  dollar as a foreign anchor. But the key point is that Japan is not 
the centre of their trade strategies. Each Asian  country faces numerous, small  Asian partners, 
and  a  single,  very  large,  American  partner.  Their  trade  strategy  will  likely  continue  to be 
defined in relation to this large partner, unless some form of  monetary coordination emerges in 
Asia 
9
.  Section 3.3  provides a simple model in order to infer the optimal foreign anchor for an 
Asian currency. 
9 Monetary coordination may be initiated by another country than Japan. In November 1995, for instance, the 
Governor  of the  Australian central bank proposed  the  creation of an institution for  regional  coordination. 
However,  Japan may  recognise the needs for regional coordination. For this purpose, it could use the existing 
41 3.2.2. Central and Eastern Europe 
a.  Trade flows 
Most ofCEECs' exports are directed to Western Europe, as shown in Table 3.4. The share of 
the US  does not exceed 4.1  %,  except in Bulgaria (7.5%). It is  very low in  Baltic countries 
(less than 2%). The share of intra-CEECs trade is low too, except in Baltic countries where it 
exceeds  I  Oo/o 
10
.  The high figure for the Czech Republic and for Slovakia stems from previous 
national trade inside Czechoslovakia. 
Table 3.4: The country breakdown of CEECs exports, in 1994 
%of  exports 
West Eur.  CEECs  USA 
Bulgaria  61.1  2.3  7.5 
Czech Republic  65.7  25.1  2.4 
Hungary  82.1  7.4  4.1 
Poland  80.3  5.4  3.5 
Romania  57.8  6.4  3.2 
Slovakia  52.2  43.5  2.6 
Slovenia  86.9  3.3  3.7 
Estonia  80.4  13.8  1.9 
Latvia  84.1  11.0  1.2 
Lithuania  77.8  18.4  0.6 
Source: European Commission. 
b.  Capital flows 
Foreign  direct  investment  tn  transition  countries  ts  concentrated  on  a  small  number  of 
countries: over the 1992-94 period, 34°/o of total flows were directed to Hungary,  14% to the 
Czech Republic,  8°/o  to Poland and  16°/o to Russia.  Thus the origin of total foreign investment 
projects in  transition countries (reported on  Chart 3.1) should be quite representative of the 
situation in  these four countries. It shows that 59% of the projects come from the European 
Union,  the  major investors being  Germany and  Austria.  The origin of direct  investments to 
Baltic countries is  quite  different.  In Estonia,  for  instance,  53% of direct  investment comes 
from Finland and  11.1% from Sweden. The share of  the United States is only 3.8o/o  (see IMF, 
1995). 
EMEAP  (Executive  Meeting of East  Asia  and Pacific  Central Banks), which broadly covers  non-American 
members of the APEC and was created by the Bank of Japan in 1991. 
10 This feature can be explained by the size of  Baltic countries. 
42 Chart 3.1: Foreign investment projects in countries in transition by origin (1990-93) 
Share of  total number of  announced projects 
other Eur. 
Union 
28% 
Other 
28% 
Japan Austria 
3%  9% 
United States 
19% 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook, may 1995. 
The role of  the European Union is even greater concerning bank loans, as shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: International bank liabilities by creditor country, at end-Dec. 1994 
(
0/o of total external bank debt). 
United States  EU*  United States  EU* 
Bulgaria  3.4  72.9  Poland  5.2  80.0 
Former Czechosl  9.7  69.2  Romania  2.3  88.2 
Hungary  3.7  69.2  Former Sov. U  1.8  85.5 
*including Austria. 
Source: BIS, Ventilation par Echeance, Secteur et Nationalite des Prets Bancaires lnternationaux, juillet 1995. 
Although the EU is the main supplier of  capital, the long-term debt of  East-European countries 
continues  to  be  mainly  denominated  in  dollars  in  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Slovenia  and  Baltic 
countries (Table 3 .6). Conversely, the DM is prominent in Poland and in the Slovak Republic. 
In  all  cases but Bulgaria and  Latvia,  debts  repayable  in  multiple  currencies,  which  include 
ECU-denominated debts,  are  significant.  But ECU debts  are  not equivalent  to forthcoming 
Euro-debts since the present ECU is a basket that provides a smaller risk for investors than the 
forthcoming Euro. 
Table 3.6: Currency composition of long-term external debt (
0/o at end-December 1993) 
US dollar  DM  Multiple  US dollar  DM  Multiple 
currency  currency 
Bulgaria  48.6  29.6  1.7  Slovak: Rep.  25.3  34.4  15.6 
Czech Rep.  27.8  14.8  27.2  Slovenia  32.8  12.1  15.5 
Hungary  29.4  12.9  13.7  Estonia  42.0  3.6  23.1 
Poland  12.9  29.4  13.7  Latvia  67.2  17.6  3.2 
Romania  27.6  7.8  24.0  Lithuania  40.1  0.2  25.4 
Source: The World Bank, World Debt Tables,  1994-95. 
In brief,  the regional integration of Central and Eastern Europe is  different from that of the 
Asian countries in two ways: 
- Unlike  the  Asian  countries,  there  is  little  trade between these  countries,  and  virtually  no 
capital flows; 
43 - The  CEECs are  much  more  dependent  on  the European Union  for  both trade and  capital 
flows  than are the Asian  countries vis-a-vis Japan.  But except  in  Poland and  in  the  Slovak 
republic, the DM only represents a minor share of the external debt, while the yen is  the first 
currency of  denomination for the debt of  all ASEAN countries. 
3.3. Rationale for exchange rate policies in Asia and in the CEECs 
In this  section,  the de facto  exchange  rate  policies  of the  CEECs  and  of Asian  countries 
evidenced in  Section 2 are rationalised in the light of  empirical features studied in Section 3 .2. 
It has been argued above that pegging the currency to a foreign anchor in real terms must be 
related to some external account target, while a nominal peg aims at some inflation target. The 
choice of a real anchor is first analysed through a simple optimisation model where the public 
authorities  are  supposed  to  target  the  external  account  (Section  3.3 .1 ).  A  real  anchor  is 
consistent with a nominal anchor in  the long run,  but it  may  be contradictory in  the short run 
when there is a positive inflation differential with the rest of  the world. The choice of  a nominal 
anchor is examined in Section 3.3 .2. 
3. 3.1 The choice of  a real anchor 
A  simple  optimisation  model  is  proposed  here  to  analyse  the  choice  between  vanous 
international  currencies  as  real  anchors.  Targeting  the  external  competitiveness  is  a  non-
cooperative policy which can lead to inefficiencies if other countries adopt the same policy. 
This problem is delt with through studying the choice of  a real anchor first in the small country 
case, and then in the two-country case.  Some final  remarks are subsequently proposed on the 
strategic relationships between each small country and its OECD partners. 
a.  The small country case 
Suppose the public authorities of a small country wish to minimise the squared discrepancies 
between the external account band an objective b  (both as percentages of  the nominal GDP): 
1  - 2  Min D.= -(b-b) 
2 
(3 .1) 
For simplicity,  we assume  that the monetary  authorities  optimise over a  single  period.  The 
external  account  considered  here  is  the  sum  of the  trade  balance  and  of the  debt  service 
(interests  +  principal  repayments).  Thus,  the  external  account  represents  the  needs  for 
additional foreign financings: 
44 b = 1JO e - CJ f  + b0  (3.2) 
e stands for the logarithm of the real,  effective exchange rate corresponding to the country 
distribution  of external  trade 
11
. f  is  the  logarithm  of the  real,  effective  exchange  rate 
corresponding to the currency breakdown of the external debt.  11  is the export/GDP ratio, B is 
the sum of the price elasticities of exports less one (o > 0 if the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
satisfied), cr is the debt service/GDP ratio, and bo covers omitted variables. 
The effective exchange rates can be defined as follows: 
{ 
e = esss + eksk  (3.3) 
f  = tl'sss +  tpksk  (3.4) 
where k stands either for the DM (CEECs) or for the yen (Asian countries), sds the bilateral, 
real exchange rate against currency i (i=$,k), ei  is the weight of currency i-country as a trade 
partner and  <Pi  is  the weight of currency i in  the denomination  of the external debt.  At this 
d 
12  stage, we assume  es + ek =  1 an  tl's +  tl'k =  1 
With  Sks  standing for the real exchange rate of currency k against the dollar, the minimisation 
of the loss function leads to the optimal reaction to k/USD fluctuations: 
&s  7Joek - CJtpk 
a·,..$  TJO- CJ 
(3.5) 
-With no external debt (cr=O),  the above solution simply becomes  &s  =  ek  :  when currency k 
&k$ 
appreciates by  1  o/o  against the USD,  the currency of the small  country appreciates by  er  o/o 
against the USD, so that its effective exchange rate e stays constant. 
- If  the currency breakdown of  the external debt fits the country distribution of  trade ( tl'k =  ek ), 
we also have  as  =  ek, because keeping e constant leads to a constant/too. In the special case 
&k$ 
where  ek = 1(100% of  trade is done with country k), pegging currency k becomes optimal. 
- If CJ  :::::  ,.,o , the optimal exchange rate policy is  undetermined since an exchange rate variation 
has no  net effect on the external account. 
11  The  trade  balance  can  be  extended  so  as  to  include  direct  investment  which  responds  to  exchange rate 
variations in a similar way to trade flows. 
12  More specifically, all trade with countries outside Western Europe (for CEECs) or outside Japan (for Asian 
countries) is supposed to be carried out with the US, and the external debt that is not denominated in currency k 
is assumed denominated in US dollar. These assumptions are relaxed in the two-country framework. 
45 The previous section has shown that in Asia, we have:  8 r  < f/Jr, while in CEECs,  &nM > fPDM. 
The following orders of  magnitude can be derived: 
k=DM, Y  CEECs  A SEAN 
Share of  k in external trade  &DM =  0.8  &y =  0.2 
Share of  k in the external debt  fPDM = 0.2  (/Jy  =  0.4 
Openess ratio  "= 0.25  "= 0.25 
Debt service ratio  cr = 0.05  cr = 0.08 
Source: orders of  magnitude based on Section 3.2. 
Finally,  the price elasticities of external trade have been estimated by Mimosa {1996) for the 
NICs, implying 8 = 1.4 
13
. Estimates of  the price elasticities are still very uncertain for CEECs. 
There is  no  reason why the price elasticities of CEECs should differ from  those of ASEAN 
countries. Therefore, we take 8 =  1.4 for all of  them. 
With this calibration, the optimal exchange rate policies are: 
For the CEECs: 
For ASEAN countries: 
The optimal regime for the CEECs is  a almost a peg to the DM.  This result comes from the 
fact that most trade flows are carried out with the European Union.  Conversely, when the yen 
appreciates by  1%  against the USD,  the currencies of Asian  countries should appreciate by 
0.14% against the USD  in  order to  keep  the  external  account  constant.  This  small  weight 
attributed  to  the  yen  in  the  optimal  basket  peg  comes  from  the  fact  that  (i) exchange  rate 
fluctuations  have  a greater impact  on the external  account through trade flows than through 
the valorisation of  the external debt service ( 178 >a); (ii) Japan plays a smaller role as  a trade 
partner than  the  yen  does  as  a  creditor currency  ( 8 r < rp r ).  This  result  fits  quite  well  the 
policies evidenced in  Section 2 for Asia,  but not for the CEECs. However, the small country 
framework hides the fact that some trade is carried out with countries other than the US, the 
E. U.  and Japan. 
13  The estimates of the price-elasticities are I. 9 for exports and 0. 5 for imports. 8 is the sum of the elasticities 
less one. This estimate is applied to A  SEAN countries due to the lack of estimates for the latters. 
46 b.  The two-country case 
Suppose now that there are two, identical countries, called A and B. Both countries have trade 
relations between each other,  and  they compete on the same foreign markets (country k and 
the US). The bilateral trade between both countries represents  (1-&s -ek) = (1-e)% ofthe total 
trade of each country 
14
.  Neither currency is used for the denomination of  the debt of  the other 
country. The effective exchange rates of  currency A must be re-defined as: 
{
eA  =  &ss$4 + ekst + (1- e)s~  (3.6) 
fA =  rpsst + rpkst  (3.7) 
where  sAJ  stands for  the  exchange rate of currency  A against  currency j  G=$,k,B).  Similar 
relations prevail for currency B.  Like in  the small  country case,  each country minimises the 
squared discrepancies of its external account from  a target. If country A takes for given the 
exchange rate of  its partner against the USD, its optimal exchange rate policy does not change 
compared to the small country case (equation 3.5). But if it knows that country B will follow 
the same exchange rate policy, then its reactions to yen/$ fluctuations are modified: 
(3.8) 
Now, when currency A depreciates against the USD, the effect on the trade account is reduced 
because  currency  B  also  depreciates.  Thus,  the  optimal  policy  is  rebalanced  in  favour  of 
currency k.  Withe= 0.85 in the CEECs and 0.5 in ASEAN countries 
15
,  the optimal exchange 
rate policies become: 
For the CEECs: 
For ASEAN countries: 
Now,  CEECs currencies overshoot DM/USD fluctuations.  When the yen appreciates by  1% 
against the dollar, the optimal policy for ASEAN countries now is to appreciate the currency 
against the dollar by 0.4%. But the solution of  the optimisation problem becomes unstable for 
small  values of e.  With e = 0.2, we have  ry8&- a:::: o:  the variations in the exchange rate have 
14  Hence, all trade of country A (resp.  B) is assumed to be carried out with the US and with countries k and B 
(resp. A). 
15  This figures  correspond to  the  share of exports  that  are  directed  to  the US  or Western Europe (for the 
CEECs) or Japan (for the ASEAN countries). 
47 little impact on the external account since the valuation effects make for the competitiveness 
effects.  In this  case,  there  may  be  no  optimal  basket  peg,  i.e.  the  floating  regime  may  be 
optimal
16
. 
In brief, the development of  trade between Asian countries other than Japan may rebalance the 
exchange rate strategies in favour of more stability against the yen,  or push Asian countries 
towards more flexible regimes.  Conversely, the optimal policy for the CEECs will be a peg to 
the DM, provided (i) the EU stays the main partner in the region, and (ii) the debt-service does 
not increase, or if  it does, it is mostly denominated in European currencies. 
Of course,  this  very  simple  model  does  not  cover the  whole rationale for  the exchange rate 
policies.  More  specifically,  this  model  does  not  describe  trade-off made  by  the  monetary 
authorities  between  various  objectives.  Here,  pegging  the  currency  to  the  optimal  basket 
allows to reach the single objective.  An  interesting extension would be to introduce a second 
objective in the model. For instance, the monetary authorities may wish a real appreciation in 
order to reduce the inflation rate.  Then,  targeting the external account would have a cost in 
terms  of the  second  objective.  Such  an  enriched  model  would  probably  show  that  Asian 
countries  may  be  better  off in  coordinating  their  exchange  rate  policies,  because  such  a 
coordination would eliminate ineffective exchange rate fluctuations.  Conversely, there is  little 
to expect from  coordination among the CEECs, because the trade between CEECs is  small 
compared to trade flows with the EU. But because most of  their external trade is done with the 
EU,  the CEECs more than the ASEAN countries may  not choose their  real  exchange  rate 
policy without taking the reaction of  their main partner into account. 
c.  Strategic interactions with the US, Japan or the EU 
Strategic interactions emerge because the country whose currency is depreciating in real terms 
faces threats of  increasing trade barriers from importing countries. This argument applied in the 
past to trade relations between the Asian NICs and the United States (see Kwan,  1994). The 
yen appreciation against the US dollar in  1985-86 was not followed by the Asian NICs whose 
export competitiveness improved sharply. By 1987, their trade account surplus reached $30.6 
billion (1 0.2% of GDP).  As  a result,  trade frictions  arose,  and the United States announced 
that by  January  1989 the four  countries would  be  deprived  of their  special  tariff treatment 
under the  General  System  of Preferences.  Simultaneously the US  put  pressure  on  them to 
16  The share of bilateral trade between A and B under-estimates the extent of the competition between both 
countries,  because  it  does  not  consider  competition  on  third  markets.  Considering  the  whole  competition 
between both countries would lower E. 
48 revalue  their  currencies  and  open  their  markets  to  US  goods and  services.  As  a  response, 
Ta"iwan and Korea revalued their currencies by 54% and (respectively), between rnid-1986 and 
mid-1989.  Hong Kong and  Singapore, which had few restrictions on imports, were submitted 
to less pressure and their currencies remained stable (Hong Kong) or appreciated at a slower 
pace (Singapore). 
This sort of strategic interactions will  likely be even more relevant for the CEECs for which 
80% of  the external trade is done with the EU 
17
.  This means that the real exchange rate policy 
of  a country is constrained by possible retaliations that prevent the country from adopting any 
mercantilist behaviour. The importing country can put upward pressure on the real exchange 
rate directly (through tariffs) or indirectly (through threats). 
3.3.2 The choice ofa nominal anchor 
Section 3. 1 showed that a nominal  anchor is consistent with a real anchor in a country with a 
large traded goods sector (provided this sector be price-taker). This will likely be the case for 
small  countries like Baltic countries,  Slovania,  Slovakia in Europe, or Singapore, Malaysia in 
Asia.  Other countries need to make a trade-off in  the  short run  between their nominal  target 
and their real target. 
The  choice  of an  international  nominal  anchor  is  influenced  by  the  country  breakdown  of 
imports, like for the real anchor. But several other criteria may interfere. First, pegging a single 
currency is  more credible than pegging a basket of currencies since it is  more visible  and it 
cannot be manipulated by public authorities who might rearrange the weights inside the basket. 
Second,  the  nominal  anchor  should  be  a  currency with  a  solid  reputation,  i.e.  with  a  low 
inflation record.  Lastly, the domestic currency should be pegged to that of a main exporting 
partner, in order to take advantage of the stability of import prices, and to avoid distortions in 
the terms of  trade. 
Foil owing this framework,  the Asian countries should be indifferent in the choice of a dollar 
peg or a yen peg. Thus, they will not question the historical policy which is to peg the dollar. 
Conversely, transition countries should prefer the Deutschemark to the dollar as a nominal peg. 
But the ERM crises  disqualified  the ECU as  a stable  nominal  anchor,  and  several  countries 
increased  the  dollar  weight  in  their  basket  peg.  The  European  Monetary  Unification  may 
17  Although  in  1994,  the EU  trade account was  in surplus with CEECs while the US  trade account was  in 
deficit with Asian countries. 
49 encourage the use of the Euro as  a nominal anchor in  central and  eastern Europe, since the 
European System of Central Banks will  guarantee its  stability.  Alternatively,  the  monetary 
policy of  the Union may prevent central and eastern European countries from pegging the Ecu 
in case there is a bias towards an appreciation of  the European currency. 
3.4. Conclusion: potential role of the Euro and of the yen as international anchors 
The above analysis  suggests that the emergence of the Euro and of the yen as  international 
anchors will  rely on four key variables:  (i)  the orientation of external trade,  (ii) the size and 
currency-denomination of the external debt,  , (iii) monetary coordination and (iv)  size effects. 
On these grounds, we can list the conditions for a simultaneous emergence of  the Euro and the 
yen as international anchors (scenario I). 
Scenario 1: the Euro and the yen emerge as international currencies. 
(i) The EU stays the main partner of  CEECs for trade and direct investment, while intra-Asian 
trade (including trade with Japan) further develops. 
(ii) The external debt service does not increase in the CEECs. If it does,  most of the debt is 
denominated in European currencies. In Asia,  on the contrary, the share of  the yen is reduced 
in order to match that of  Japan in external trade. 
(iii)  A  coordination  emerges  among  Asian  countries,  which  enables  them  to  choose  a 
cooperative exchange rate policy 
18
.  Such a coordination is not necessary in the CEECs given 
the  small  share of intra-CEECs trade,  and  given  their common will  to join the EU in  some 
future. 
(iv)  Relative  transaction  and  information  costs  for  Euro  and  yen  transactions  are  reduced 
because of  the enlargening of  both markets and because exchange rates against both currencies 
are more stable. Thus, private agents start using the Euro and  the yen as units of account and 
as means of  payment. 
18 Such an eventuality was raised after the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994, when the crisis was passed 
on Asian financial markets, and when, consequently, Asian central banks met in HongKong in January as a 
first  attempt of informal  cooperation.  The first  agreement for  monetary  cooperation  emerged  in  November 
1995,  when five  governors  of central  banks  agreed  to  give  participants  access  to  immediate  cash  (against 
securities of US Treasury bonds) to help them defend their currencies in times of market stress.  Yet, this first 
agreement concerned small amounts (each central bank can mobilise between US$500m and US$lbn, which is 
small compared to the total reserves of the participants (US$403bn), see Financial Times,  11/21/1995). See also 
footnote 9. 
50 The  four  conditions are  dependent  one from  another.  For instance,  if the perspective of an 
integration into the EU vanishes for several CEECs, then the EU may see its role reduced in 
those countries.  The transactions with the Euro would be reduced, which would prevent the 
Euro transaction costs from declining. 
Scenario II:  only the Euro emerges. 
One problem with the scenario I is that the development of  intra-Asian trade actually may lead 
to more flexible exchange rate regimes in  Asia,  as shown in Section 3.3 .1.  Furthermore, the 
simultaneous rise in the share of Japan as a trade partner,  and decline in the yen as a debt-
denomination currency,  is  quite unlikely,  given the stylised facts presented in  Section 3 .2.1. 
Conversely, the DM is  already the optimal peg for the CEECs,  according to our theoritical 
framework.  Some  additional  arguments  suggest  that  a  scenario  where  only  the  European 
currency becomes an international anchor is more likely than the scenario I: 
( i)  The  unification  of European  capital  markets  should  increase  the  role  of the Euro as  a 
currency of  denomination for foreign financing. 
(ii) The CEECs still need a solid nominal anchor, which may be provided by the forthcoming 
Euro since the European Central Bank will  guarantee a low inflation record.  Conversely, the 
Japanese central bank is not independent from the government, which will not guarantee a low 
inflation anchor (no more than presently the Federal Reserve). 
(iii)  The CEECs are willing to take part in the European Union.  Thus, they will endorse the 
European preference for low intra-European exchange rate volatility.  This is  not the case in 
Asia where the economic integration will not resemble that of  the E.U. 
(iv)  West-European  countries  will  not  accept  competitive  devaluations  from  CEECs.  The 
threat of EU retaliation may encourage them to keep a stable,  real  exchange rate against the 
Euro. This argument is in favor of  pegging the USD in Asia. 
(v) Exchange rate policies are relatively new in Eastern Europe, while there is a long tradition 
of  pegging currencies to the USD in Asia. 
In  case  the  yen  does  not  emerge  as  an  international  currency,  the  dollar  would  keep  an 
advantage in terms of  transaction costs. Nevertheless, the merging of  European capital markets 
will  reduce transaction an information costs on the European currency.  The ESCB and  the 
European  Commission  may  also  have  a  role  in  encouraging  trade  and  capital  flows 
denominated in European currencies. The Euro may still emerge as an international anchor. 
51 Scenario III: the Euro and the yen do not emerge as international currencies. 
According to our analysis, the emergence of  the Euro as an international anchor for the CEECs 
will  be  dependent  on  the  whether  the  EU will  maitain  its  position  in  the  region,  on  the 
development of financings  in  DM,  and  later in  Euro,  and  on the merge of European capital 
markets. In case the EMU is delayed, then the Euro may never emerge because the CEECs will 
have accumulated a large debt in USD. In addition, the European trade-off between deepening 
and enlargening will be crucial: if the CEECs do not consider they will not be accepted in the 
EU (and later on, in the EMU), if they do not receive financial support from the EU, or if  they 
suffer from tariffs in the EU, then they may have an incentive for another exchange rate policy. 
To sum up, the scenario II, which entails a regional emergence of  the Euro as an international 
anchor, seems the most likely.  But it will be dependent on the completion of  the EMU agenda 
and on the will of  the EU to enlarge the union in a near future.  Conversely, the emergence of 
the  yen  as  an  international  anchor  in  Asia  seems  quite  unlikely,  unless  some  monetary 
coordination emerges on a regional basis. 
52 4. Costs and Benefits of the Euro as an international currency 
Since  de  Gaulle's  denunciation  of the  «huge privilege»  of the  US  dollar,  it  has  become 
common  wisdom  to  say  that  the  US  has  taken  advantage of the  international  status  of its 
currency.  Could  an  internationalised  Euro  transfer  this  advantage,  at least  partially,  to  the 
European Union?  What would be the consequences for  the international  monetary  system? 
This last section deals with both questions. 
4.1. Costs and benefits for the European Union 
Like for the EMU, the debate on the costs and benefits from having an international currency 
becomes more  clear-cut if microeconomic  and  macroeconomic  arguments  are  disentangled. 
When speaking of a « huge privilege » of having an international currency, De Gaulle referred 
to  macroeconomic  arguments.  Conversely,  the  advocates  of the  EMU  have  stressed  the 
microeconomic benefits from making the forthcoming Euro an international currency. 
4. 1.1.  Microeconomic benefits 
The most straightforward benefit from  having an  international currency is the microeconomic 
benefit  due  to the  suppression of foreign  exchange transaction costs and  hedging  costs for 
European importers and exporters. In fact,  it is  necessary to disentangle the benefits for intra-
EU transactions from the benefits for EU relationships with the rest of  the world. 
- Intra-EU transactions will benefit mainly from the EMU which will make unnecessary foreign 
exchange transactions between EU members.  The emergence of the Euro as  an international 
currency would provide some additional  benefits  in  terms  of transaction costs and  hedging 
costs, because the market for the European currency will be larger and deeper. But this benefit 
will be of  second order compared to the EMU effect. 
- In the same way, transaction costs and hedging costs will be reduced for transactions with the 
rest of the world,  since the Euro will  be  exchanged for the USD or for other currencies on a 
larger  and  deeper  market.  It has  been  further  argued  that  with  an  international  Euro,  EU 
traders will  more easily pass the exchange risk to foreign traders.  In fact,  this argument does 
not  apply  if EU traders  are  price-makers,  because they  already  pass  their hedging  costs on 
export prices.  It does not apply to price-takers either, because price-takers must reduce their 
export prices when importers have to pay for hedging 
1 (see Box 3.1). 
1 However, the price-taking situation is rather theoretical since price-takers will unlikely invoice their exports 
in their own currency. 
53 Another microeconomic benefit from an international Euro would be the development of EU 
banking  activities  and  financial  cities,  although  it  is  not  clear whether the  development  of 
banking activities should be a cause or a consequence of  the emergence of  the Euro. 
Box 4.1: who pays for hedging? 
Consider the  case of an exporter in the European Union.  Its  export  price  can be written  in the domestic 
currency as: 
p  =  (  SP * )n(P(I + t))I-n 
X  (I+ t*)  ' 
with 0 :S; n :S; 1 
S:  nominal exchange rate; P:  domestic price; t: hedging cost supported by the exporter (t=O if the exports are 
Euro-denominated); t*:  hedging cost supported by  the importer (t*=O  if the exports are USD-denominated). 
Suppose the exporter does not make any profit on the domestic  market (this assumption is  equivalent to a 
constant mark-up). The cost per exported unit is: 
Cx = P(l+t) 
First case: the exporter is price-maker (n  =  0).  The profit rate is: 
Px  =l 
Cx 
It does  not  depend on  hedging costs because the exporter has the opportunity to  pass the hedging cost on its 
c.,pon pncc paid by  Lhc  1mponcr. 
Second case: the exporter ts price-taker (n  -- 1).  The profit rate is: 
P.'(  = __  S_'P_* --
Cx  P(l+t)(l+t*) 
It does not depend on who pays for hedging: if the importer pays for hedging, then the exporter must reduce its 
export price in order to meet the foreign price SP*. 
4.1.2. Macroeconomic benefits and costs 
The  most  popular  macroeconomic  benefit  from  having  an  international  currency  ts 
seignioriage.  Seignoriage  comes  from  the  fact  that  foreigners  are  willing  to  hold  the 
international  currency  without  any  interest  (transaction  balances),  or with  an  interest  that 
includes a negative premium due to the international status of  the currency (liquidity premium). 
According to Frankel ( 1995), approximately 60% of  total dollar currency in circulation is held 
by foreigners.  But the seignoriage revenue is  low:  around 0.1% of the US' GDP according to 
Emerson  el  alii  ( 1990)  and  Frankel  ( 1995).  Given  that  the  dollar  will  likely  remain  the 
international currency at least for the Latin American countries, the seignoriage revenue would 
not exceed 0.05% of  the European Union's GDP. 
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more difficult to control of the money supply.  The United  States encountered this  problem 
with the development of  Euro-markets in the 1960s and  1970s, but the monetary growth was 
largely  accepted  because the US  had  no  exchange  rate  policy,  and  because  this  monetary 
growth met the dollar preference of OPEC countries. The European central bank may have a 
different view due to its inflation target. It may weigh the loss of control on the money supply 
negatively in its implicit loss function. 
The  implications  of an  international  Euro  for  the  current  account  and  for  the  Euro/USD 
exchange rate are unclear. It has been argued that, in order to provide enough liquidity for the 
international  monetary system,  the EU current account would have to move from surplus to 
deficit,  unless the EU members accept an  appreciation of the Euro (see Ranki,  1995). In fact, 
Section  3  showed  that  the  emergence  of the  Euro  as  an  international  currency  will  be 
dependent on the use of the European currency for denominating the debt of third currencies. 
These financings  will  increase the liquidity of the Euro market,  and the EU current account 
could stay in surplus 
2
.  But this liquidity should not be sterilised by the ESCB. A conflict may 
emerge between the ESCB (in charge of maintaining a low inflation record) and the ministers 
of  finance who will be aware of  the Euro/USD exchange rate 
3
. 
Finally, the impact of  the international status of  the Euro on its volatility is unclear. On the one 
hand,  a deeper Euro market should entail less volatility in  the exchange rate because a given 
capital flow will  have less effect on the stocks. However this argument is controversial since it 
does not take into account the fact  that portfolio movements are highly dependent one from 
another,  which  may  give rise  to surges into,  or out of the European currency.  These surges 
may be very costly for the European central bank if  it tries to keep the Euro under control. The 
volatility of  the Euro/USD is further examined in the next section. 
4.2. Benefits and costs for the International Monetary System 
The great volatility and apparent misalignments of exchange rates since the breakdown of the 
Bretton  Woods  system  has  recently  raised  the  question  of reforming  the  International 
Monetary System. Nevertheless, the emergence of  the Euro as an international currency would 
enforce a deep transformation in the functioning of the IMS.  This section studies whether a 
2  Ranki  (1995)  agrees  on this  point:  «Given the functionning of the  modem and integrated  international 
capital  markets.  the  need  for  the  issuer country  of an  international  currency  to  provide  liquidity  is  not  as 
pronounced as m the past » (p.  28). 
'Sec Benass~. Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1994). 
55 bipolar monetary system would improve the functioning of exchange rate flexibility and make 
the exchange rates more  stable.  The first  to sections deal  with mechanical  implications of a 
multipolar IMS, while the last section raises the question of  the G7 coordination. 
4. 2.1 The current account argument 
The present instability of  the IMS may be related to the fact that flexible exchange rates do not 
play their role in adjusting current accounts. Specifically, about 48% of  US trade is carried out 
with  countries that de facto  do  not have  a  flexible  exchange  rate with the US  dollar  (see 
Section 2).  Thus,  a  19% depreciation of the dollar against the DM and the yen is  needed to 
induce a 10% depreciation of  the dollar's effective exchange rate (  Aglietta et alii,  1994). This 
inefficiency  of the  international  monetary  system  would  disappear  if the  Asian  countries 
switched to a yen  peg (Collignon,  1995).  However, the internationalisation of the Euro would 
not  have the same impact since it  would first  concern the CEECs who are minor partners for 
the US (see Table 4.1 ). 
T  bl  4 1  C  a  e  .  :  ountry b  kd  rea  own o  fUS  d  .  1994  externa  tra em 
in%  Exports  Imports 
Western Europe  25  20 
Canada  20  20 
Japan  11  19 
Latin America  17  13 
Asian NICs  10  10 
Other Asia  8  11 
OPEC  5  6 
Australia  2  1 
Eastern Europe *  1  0 
Other  1  0 
Total  100  100 
*ex-USSR, Belarus, Ukraine, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Slovak Rep., 
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania. 
Source: CEPII  -CHELEM data base. 
-1.:!.:!  lhe capllal account argument 
It has been argued above that a deeper market for the Euro would not necessary induce more 
stability in the Euro exchange rates since (i) the decision of asset holders are highly correlated, 
and  (ii)  in  a world of perfect capital  mobility,  official  interventions have little  impact on the 
exchange rate. However, a given current account imbalance should have a different impact on 
exchange rates according to currency breakdown of the financings.  This argument is  analysed 
here with the help  of a simple portfolio choice model derived from Branson and Henderson 
(1985). This model describes the determination of exchange rates in a world with one or two 
international currencies, but it does not describe the transition between the two situations (see 
56 Annex 8).  The model assumes a world composed of  two countries called A and B (for the US 
and the EU). Both countries have the same size. In a first step, there is  only one international 
currency (the USD). The United-States is running a current account deficit.  Subsequently, the 
USD depreciates. In order to meet their fixed,  optimal portfolio allocation, EU agents increase 
their holdings in USD, which stabilises the balance of  payments. The magnitude ofthe currency 
depreciation depends on the initial net external positions.  Whether exchange rate volatility is 
greater  with  one  or two  international  currencies  thus  depends  on  the  initial  net  external 
position of the two countries: the least volatility is  obtained with two currencies if the initial 
situation is  close to balance, but with only one currency if there is  an initial imbalance.  Given 
that the initial external position of  the US is strongly negative, it can be concluded that dollar 
fluctuations would be even greater if  the international status was shared with another currency. 
Issuing US bonds denominated in Euro would have a stabilising effect on the dollar during the 
transition towards the multi-polar system.  But once optimal  portfolio allocations have been 
reached,  this  stock  of bonds would  have  a  destabilising  effect,  since  it  would  be revalued 
should the dollar depreciate. 
However, the model  does not take portfolio reallocations into account (ka  and kb are constant 
in  the  model).  Whatever  the  level  of net  external  positions,  the  coexistence  of several 
international  currencies  as  reserve  currencies  is  likely  to  induce  large  swings  in  portfolio 
choices,  when expected yield  differentials  or expected  risks  are moving (Bourguinat,  1992). 
This is because asset holders have a preferred habitat for (i) their domestic currency and (ii) the 
international currency. In case there are several international currencies, the arbitrage between 
the international currencies is  consistent with keeping a large share of their holdings in  their 
preferred habitats. 
In brief,  the capital account argument says that sharing the international currency status may 
actually magnify the instability of exchange rates.  However, this  is  a  mechanical  effect with 
exogenous expected returns.  The monetary authorities of both the US  and the EU will  likely 
react in the fluctuations of  their exchange rates. 
-1. 2. 3 G7 coordination 
Would G7 coordination be easier in a multi-polar monetary system? The first argument is that 
the United States would be obliged to take the dollar fluctuations more seriously, since a part 
of its foreign trade and capital net earnings would be denominated in Euro or in yen.  But the 
monetary union (which is a necessary condition for the emergence of  the European currency as 
57 an  international currency) may  reduce the motivation of EU countries to participate  in  G-7 
coordination, as shown by Benassy, Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1994). 
This  study  has  shown  that  whether  the  Euro  (and  the  yen)  will  become  an  international 
currency will  depend on the behaviour of third currencies.  Specifically,  the emergence of the 
Euro and maybe, of  the yen, as international anchors will be consistent with increasing official 
reserves held by third countries in both currencies. Hence, the G7 will no longer be the correct 
framework to coordinate interventions. 
One might think of  an extreme scenario of  complete regionalism, with three blocs with regional 
trade flows,  regional capital flows,  and  regional anchors.  In this case,  a small  share of world 
transactions would be carried out between the three regions,  and  exchange rate fluctuations 
between the Euro, the yen and the USD would be unimportant. But such a scenario is rather 
unlikely:  in  1994,  trade flows  between the three blocs  amounted to  23o/o  of world  exports, 
while  the share  of intra-regional  trade was  32% 
4
.  Hence,  a reform  of the  IMS  will  likely 
become even more important than it is today. 
' Source: CEPII.  Intra-regional trade includes intra-EU trade and transactions between Asian countries 
including Japan. 
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61 Annex 1: Nominal monetary zones 
US dollar zone 
1974-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
United-States  United-States  United-States  United-States 
Canada  Canada  Canada  Canada 
OECD  Greece 
Yugoslavia 
New-Zealand 
Australia 
Colombia  Colombia  Colombia  Colombia 
Bolivia  Bolivia 
Paraguay  Paraguay 
Venezuela  Venezuela 
Brazil 
Ecuador 
Guyana 
LATIN AMERICA  Peru 
Uruguay  Uruguay 
Chile 
Panama  Panama  Panama  Panama 
Haiti  Hai'ti  Hai'ti 
Honduras  Honduras  Honduras 
Guatemala  Guatemala 
El Salvador  El Salvador 
Dominican Rep  Dominican Rep 
Dominica  Dominica  Dominica 
Costa-Rica  Costa-Rica 
Mexico 
Korea  Korea  Korea  Korea 
Philippines  Philippines  Philippines  Philippines 
Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thall  and 
Pakistan  Pakistan  Pakistan  Pakistan 
Mghanistan  Mghanistan  Mghanistan  Mghanistan 
Nepal  Nepal  Nepal  Nepal 
Singapore  Singapore  Singapore 
ASIA  Malaysia  Malaysia  Malaysia 
Sri-Lanka  Sri-Lanka  Sri-Lanka 
Bhutan  Bhutan 
India  India 
Myanmar 
Bangladesh  Bangladesh 
China  China 
Indonesia 
Djibouti  Djibouti  Djibouti  Djibouti 
Ethiopia  Ethiopia  Ethiopia 
Mauritania  Mauritania 
Kenya  Kenya 
AFRICA  Burundi 
Malawi 
Nigeria 
Sudan 
Mozambique 
Ghana 
Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia 
Bahrain  Bahrain  Bahrain  Bahrain 
United Arab Emir.  United Arab Emir.  United Arab Emir.  United Arab Emir. 
Kuwait  Kuwait  Kuwait  Kuwait 
Oman  Oman  Oman  Oman 
MIDDLE EAST  Qatar  Qatar  Qatar  Qatar 
Jordan  Jordan  Jordan 
Syria  Syria  Syria 
Iran  Iran 
Libya  Libya 
Egypt  Egypt 
.. ./  ... 
62 DMzone 
1975-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
Germany  Germany  Germany  Germany 
Belgium  Belgium  Belgium  Belgium 
Denmark  Denmark  Denmark  Denmark 
Netherlands  Netherlands  Netherlands  Netherlands 
EC  France  France  France 
Italy  Italy  Italy 
Ireland  Ireland  Ireland 
Portugal  Portugal 
Spain  Spain 
United-Kingdom 
Greece 
Austria  Austria  Austria  Austria 
Norway  Norway  Norway  Norway 
OTHEREUR.  Switzerland  Switzerland  Switzerland  Switzerland 
Sweden  Sweden  Sweden 
Finland  Finland  Finland 
Iceland 
FF zone  FF zone  FF zone 
Cape Verde  Cape Verde  Cape Verde  Cape Verde 
Tunisia  Tunisia  Tunisia 
AFRICA  Morocco  Morocco 
Mauritius  Mauritius 
Madag_ascar 
Yen zone 
1975-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
Zo  'h  ne wat  .  I  h  out a smgJ e anc  or 
1975-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
United-Kingdom  United-Kingdom  United-Kingdom 
Spain  Spain 
Portugal  Portugal 
E.C.  France 
Italy 
Ireland 
Greece  Greece 
Turkey  Turkey  Turkey  Turkey 
Australia  Australia  Australia 
New-Zealand  New-Zealand  New-Zealand 
OTHEROECD  Iceland  Iceland  Iceland 
Finland 
Yugoslavia  Yugoslavia  Yugoslavia 
Sweden 
Argentina  Argentina  Argentina  Argentina 
Chile  Chile  Chile 
Uruguay  Uruguay 
Peru 
Brazil  Brazil  Brazil 
Ecuador  Ecuador  Ecuador 
Guyana  Guyana  Guyana 
Bolivia  Bolivia 
Paraguay  Paraguay 
LA TIN AMERICA  Peru  Peru 
Venezuela  Venezuela 
Jamaica  Jamaica  Jamaica  Jamaica 
Mexico  Mexico  Mexico 
Costa-Rica  Costa-Rica 
Dominica 
Guatemala  Guatemala 
Dominican Rep.  Dominican Rep. 
El Salvador  El Salvador 
Haiti 
Honduras 
.. ./  ... 
63 I  ...... 
Indonesia  Indonesia  Indonesia 
China  China 
Bangladesh  Bangladesh 
India  India 
ASIA  Malaysia 
Myanmar  Myanmar  Myanmar 
Sri Lanka 
Bhutan  Bhutan 
South Africa  South Africa  South Africa  South Africa 
Algeria  Algeria  Algeria  Algeria 
Botswana  Botswana  Botswana  Botswana 
Gambia  Gambia  Gambia  Gambia 
Lesotho  Lesotho  Lesotho  Lesotho 
Liberia  Liberia  Liberia  Liberia 
Tanzania  Tanzania  Tanzania  Tanzania 
Zaire  Zaire  Zaire  Zaire 
Madagascar  Madagascar  Madagascar 
Mauritius  Mauritius 
Morocco  Morocco 
AFRICA  FF zone 
Mozambique  Mozambique  Mozambique 
Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe 
Ghana  Ghana  Ghana 
Burundi  Burundi  Burundi 
Malawi  Malawi  Malawi 
Nigeria  Nigeria  Nigeria 
Sudan  Sudan  Sudan 
Kenya  Kenya 
Mauritania  Mauritania 
Tunisia 
Ethiopia 
Israel  Israel  Israel  Israel 
Lebanon  Lebanon  Lebanon  Lebanon 
Egypt  Egypt 
MIDDLE-EAST  Iran  Iran 
Libya  Libya 
Syria 
Hungary 
Cent. & East EUR  Poland 
Romania 
64 Annex 2: computing long-run estimates 
The long-run estimates are computed using the Wold lag formula,  which makes it possible to 
test with a Student t for the significance of  the sum of  the coefficients estimated for the lags of 
each explanatory variable. Consider equation 2.2: 
D.Sk,$  = D+A(L)Mk,$ +B(L)MvM,s +C(L)Mr,s +e 
This relation can be re-written as: 
(2.2) 
II  II 
LlSk,$(1) = D+A(l)Ll.Sk,$(1-1)+ L.(6
2Sk,$(t-i)+B(l)AS'DM,$(t)+ LBt6
2
SDM,$(t-i) 
i=l  i=O 
II 
+ C(l)Mr.sU) + L  c;* 6
2 Sr.sU- i) + e 
1=0 
12  12  12 
with  ~· = - L  a1 ,  Bt =-Lbl'  C:=- Let. 
l=i+I  l=i+l  l=k+l 
The same methodology is applied to the estimation of  the implicit real basket pegs. 
65 Annex 3: Estimates of the implicit, nominal basket pegs 
WESTERN EUROPE 
E  22  ;quatlon 
1974:05-1980:01  1980:02-1985:02 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  C(l)  Rz  kliJ  Country  B{O)  B(l)  C(O)  C(l) 
Austria  0.962**  1.082**  -0.012  -0.053  0.962  0  Austria  1.000**  0.662**  -0.013  0.002 
Belgiwn  0.918**  1.227**  -0.015  -0.003  0.937  0  Belgiwn  0.851**  0.850**  0.091  0.129 
Denmark  0.900**  1.093**  -0.108  0.104  0.794  0  Denmark  0.878**  0.841**  0.072*  0.042 
Finland  0.527**  0.703**  -0.001  -0.147  0.455  0  Finland  0.500**  0.335*  0.231 **  0.306* 
France  0.599**  0.925**  0.116  -0.049  0.480  0  France  0.879**  0.616**  0.118*  0.204* 
Greece  0.405**  0.487**  -0.049  0.024  0.430  4  Greece  0.838**  0.780**  -0.237  -0.178 
Italy  0.434**  0.541**  -0.013  -0.022  0.431  0  Italy  0.732**  0.735**  0.172**  0.139* 
ireland  0.423**  0.555**  0.074  -0.021  0.367  0  Ireland  0.883**  0.566**  0.019  0.020 
Netherl.  0.925**  0.930**  0.004  -0.020  0.918  6  Netherl.  0.964**  1.064**  -0.000  -0.082 
Portugal  0.686**  0.722**  -0.017  -0.271  0.212  0  Portugal  0.641 **  0.676  0.145  0.191 
Spain  0.096  0.230  0.085  0.063  0.070  0  Spain  0.647**  0.574  -0.106  0.008 
Sweden  0.788**  1.110**  -0.045  -0.214  0.583  0  Sweden  0.240*  0.187  0.426**  0.782** 
UK  0.436**  0.567**  0.105  -0.112  0.363  0  UK  0.533**  1.375**  0.072  -0.019 
Iceland  0.355  0.072  -0.052  -0.194  -0.054  7  Iceland  0.231  -0.521  0.035  0.317 
Norway  0.822**  0.852**  -0.054  -0.084  0.744  0  Norway  0.535**  0.454**  0.156**  0.413** 
Switzerland  0.806**  0.533  0.167*  0.321  0.700  0  Switzerland  0.904**  0.998**  0.146*  0.040 
1985:03-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  C(l)  R2 
k~l)  Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  C(l) 
Austria  0.999**  1.005**  -0.002  -0.003  0.999  12  Austria  1.007**  1.628**  -0.004  -0.008 
Belgiwn  0.968**  1.106**  -0.001  -.088**  0.994  0  Belgiwn  0.975**  1.065**  -0.058  -0.323* 
Denmark  0.970**  0.974**  -0.013  -.087**  0.988  0  Denmark  0.861**  1.161 **  -0.040  -0.285 
Finland  0.683**  0.823**  0.112**  -0.142  0.878  0  Finland  0.821 **  1.096**  0.136  0.047 
France  0.929**  0.827**  -0.001  -0.079*  0.973  0  France  0.903**  0.972**  -0.018  -0.175 
Greece  0.827**  0.578**  -0.096  0.028  0.762  0  Greece  0.770**  0.898**  0.006  -0.009 
Italy  0.849**  0.709**  0.016  -0.019  0.960  0  Italy  0.266  0.190  0.026  0.436 
Ireland  0.866**  1.099**  0.044  -0.124  0.812  0  Ireland  0.759**  1.432**  -0.107  -0.127 
Netherl.  0.997**  1.128**  -0.003  -0.005  0.998  0  Netherl.  0.980**  0.997**  0.009  0.000 
Portugal  0.752**  0.746**  0.070*  -0.040  0.912  0  Portugal  0.949**  1.070**  -0.087  -0.424 
Spain  0.809**  0.860**  0.049  -0.065  0.863  0  Spain  0.853**  1.237*  -0.113  -0.201 
Sweden  0.689**  0.777**  0.044  0.109*  0.940  0  Sweden  0.576**  0.964  -0.138  -0.177 
UK  0.694**  0.783**  0.184*  -0.123  0.663  0  UK  0.665**  0.065  -0.128  0.548 
lee land  0.569**  0.879**  0.025  -0.266  0.660  0  Iceland  0.800**  1.213**  -0.062  0.330 
Norway  0.760**  0.944**  0.014  -0.198  0.862  0  Norway  0.897**  1.258**  -0.127  -0.235 
Switzerland  0.925**  0.804**  0.126**  -0.052  0.909  12  Switzerland  1.123**  1.012**  0.051  0.036 
* Significantly*' 0 at 10%.  ** Significantly*' 0 at 5%.  Underlined: not significantly*' 1 at 5% (for B(O) only). 
( I ) highest order of  autocorrelation of  residuals (k =  0 to  12) at 5% (Breusch-Godfrey test). 
Source: author's calculations based on IFS data 
E  23  ,quatton  .  a 
1974:05-1980:01  1980:02-1985:02 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  R2 
k~l)  Country  B(O)  B(l)  R2  k(l) 
Austria  0.947**  0.963**  0.976  0  Austria  0.991**  0.733**  0.997  0 
Belgiwn  0.928**  1.242**  0.947  0  Belgiwn  0.913**  0.949**  0.873  0 
Denmark  0.842**  0.733**  0.774  0  Denmark  0.926**  0.881**  0.947  0 
Finland  0.541**  0.552**  0.481  0  Finland  0.645**  0.568**  0.606  0 
France  0.685**  0.932**  0.528  0  France  0.952**  0.621**  0.873  0 
Greece  0.401 **  0.471 **  0.466  0  Greece  0.666**  0.692**  0.325  0 
Italy  0.429**  0.565**  0.461  0  Italy  0.842**  0.856**  0.895  0 
Ireland  0.470**  0.536**  0.393  0  Ireland  0.895**  0.588**  0.937  0 
Netherl.  0.930**  0.907**  0.926  0  Nether  I.  0.966**  1.014**  0.984  7 
Portugal  0.689**  0.515*  0.224  0  Portugal  0.748**  0.725**  0.644  0 
Spain  0.194  0.234  0.048  0  Spain  0.572**  0.362**  0.533  0 
Sweden  0.725**  0.494**  0.571  0  Sweden  0.520**  0.449**  0.329  0 
UK  0.477**  0.473**  0.375  0  UK  0.584**  1.331**  0.493  9 
Iceland  0.322  -0.150  -0.018  10  Iceland  0.252  -0.317  0.039  0 
Norway  0.782**  0.784**  0.743  0  Norway  0.645**  0.869**  0.767  0 
Switzerland  0.856**  0.412  0.691  0  Switzerland  1.0 15**  0.727**  0.842  0 
66 
Rz  k~IJ 
0.997  0 
0.873  0 
0.950  0 
0.629  0 
0.883  0 
0.388  0 
0.911  10 
0.933  0 
0.984  0 
0.589  0 
0.508  0 
0.429  0 
0.472  9 
0.095  0 
0.785  12 
0.842  0 
R2  k{l) 
0.999  0 
0.854  0 
0.747  0 
0.642  8 
0.861  0 
0.867  0 
0.164  0 
0.602  0 
0.997  0 
0.667  0 
0.453  0 
0.344  4 
0.530  7 
0.640  7 
0.712  0 
0.881  6 Equation 2.3a (continued} 
1985:03-1992:08  1992:09-1995:05 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  R2  ktiJ  Country  B(O)  B(l)  R2  ktiJ 
Austria  0.997**  1.004**  0.999  12  Austria  1.002**  1.002**  0.999  0 
Bt!lgiUm  0.970**  0.784**  0.992  0  Belgium  0.994**  0.954**  0.836  lO 
Denmark  0.966**  0.812**  0.985  1  Denmark  0.899**  1.021**  0.762  0 
Finland  0.763**  0.724**  0.868  0  Finland  0.889**  1.041**  0.631  10 
France  0.933**  0.683**  0.971  0  France  0.924**  0.907**  0.874  0 
Greece  0.757**  0.596**  0.766  6  Greece  0.779**  0.916**  0.883  0 
Italy  0.867**  0.717**  0.960  0  Italy  0.230  0.321  0.238  10 
Ireland  0.890**  0.991**  0.810  8  Ireland  0.691**  1.248**  0.634  0 
Nether  I.  0.996**  1.119**  0.998  0  Netherl.  0.988**  0.997**  0.997  10 
P{)rtugal  0.808**  0.718**  0.900  0  Portugal  0.914**  0.912**  0.623  0 
Spain  0.847**  0.815**  0.866  0  Spain  0.803**  1.068**  0.536  10 
Sweden  0.721**  1.007**  0.938  0  Sweden  0.463**  0.781  0.421  10 
UK  0.819**  0.706**  0.648  0  UK  0.582**  0.255  0.553  7 
Iceland  0.595**  0.694**  0.668  0  Iceland  0.777**  0.900**  0.665  0 
Norway  0.768**  0.811**  0.860  0  Norway  0.826**  1.179**  0.738  0 
Switzerland  1.019**  0.819**  0.902  12  Switzerland  1.137**  0.998**  0.890  0 
*Significantly*' 0 at 10%.  **Significantly ;e 0 at 5%.  Underlined: not significantly ;e  1 at 5% (for B(O) only). 
( 1) highest order of  autocorrelation of  residuals (k =  0 to 12) at 5% (Breusch-Godfrey test). 
Source: author's calculations based on IFS data 
CEECs 
E  t'  2 2  .g_ua  Ion 
1989:05-1992:08 (
2
)  1992:09-1995:05 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  Eo>  R2  k(l)  Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  C(l)  R2  k(l) 
Czech Rep.  0.964*  1.568*  -1.149  -3.677  0.292  0  Czech Rep.  0.615**  0.863**  0.025**  -0.016  0.990 
Hungary  0.387*  0.213  0.211  0.310  0.248  II  Hungary  0.349*  0.281  -.321 **  -0.300  0.110 
Poland  -0.462  -1.~69  I 259  3.799  0.432  0  Poland  0.272*  0.507*  0.125  -0.260  0.319 
Romania  -1.144  -0.339  0.308  -2.961  0.008  0  Romania  0.995**  2.670*  -0.122  0.284  0.276 
• Significantly *' 0 at 10%.  ** Significantly -:~: 0 at 5%.  Underlined: not significantly -:~:  1 at 5% (for B(O) only). 
(I) highest order of autocorrelation of residuals (k = 0 to  12) at 5% (Breusch-Godfrey test).  (2) 1990:05-1992:08 for the 
Czech Republic.  Source: author's calculations based on IFS data 
E  23  ,quatwn  a 
1989:05-1992:08 
12
)  1992:09-1995:05 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  R2  k(IJ  Country  B(O)  B(l)  R2  k(IJ 
Czech Rep.  0.372  -0.390  -0.009  9  Czech Rep.  0.626**  0.958**  0.988 
Hungary  0.471**  0.290  0.221  0  Hungary  0.161  0.167  0.034  10 
Poland  0.324  0.344  0.473  0  Poland  0.344**  0.416  0.284  10 
Romania  -0.716  -1.953  -0.065  0  Romania  0.898**  2.721**  0.394  0 
* Significantly-:~: 0 at 10%.  **Significantly-:~: 0 at 5%.  Underlined: not significantly ;e  I at 5% (for B(O) only). 
(1) highest order of autocorrelation of residuals (k =  0 to  12) at 5% (Breusch-Godfrey test).  (2) 1990:05-1992:08 for the 
Czech Republic.  Source: author's calculations based on IFS data 
ASIA 
E  22  ,quatwn 
1974:05-1978:10  1978:11-1985:02 
8 
0 
0 
0 
Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  Eo>  R2  k(IJ  Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  Eo>  R2  k(IJ 
Bhutan  0.419**  0.545**  -0.046  0.133  0.532  0  Bhutan  0.278**  0.526**  0.039  -0.115  0.454  0 
Chma  1.037**  0.890  -0.196  0.191  0.444  0  China  0.369**  0.483  0.147**  -0.073  0.615  0 
Korea  Constant USD peg from  1975·01 to  1979:12  Korea  0.066  -0.132  0.026  0.066  0.174  12 
India  o.419**  1 o.545**  1  -o.o46  1  0.134  1 o.632  1  0  India  0.284**  0.640**  0.007  0.121  0.511  0 
Indonesia  Constant USD peg until1978:10  Indonesia  0.118  -0.060  -0.046  -0.134  -0.118  4 
Malaysia  o.385**  1 o.541**  1  o.18o*  1  -o.o12  1 0.428  1  12  Malaysia  0.178**  0.358**  0.211 **  0.115*  0.681  0 
Pakistan  Constant USD peg until  1981: 12  Pakistan  0.110*  0.144  0.082  0.144  0.366  0 
Philippines  0.081  0.126  -0.016  -0.148  0.092  10  Philippines  -0.254  -0.009  -0.117  -0.322  -0.041  0 
Singapore  0.554**  0.559**  0.038  -0.065  0.639  12  Singapore  0.162**  0.182**  0.244**  0.242  0.821  7 
Sn Lanka  0.127  0.420  -0.186  -0.286  0.278  0  Sri Lanka  0.111*  0.238**  -0.023  -0.214  0.230  0 
Thailand  0.003  -0.007  0.013  0.029  0.282  12  Thailand  -0.064  0.211  0.040  -0.005  0.124  0 
67 Equation 2.2 (continued) 
1985:03-1990:04  1990:05-1995:05 
Country  B(O)  B(I)  C(O)  C(l)  R2  k(l)  Country  B(O)  B(l)  C(O)  C(l)  R2 
Bhutan  0.246**  0.022**  0.026  -0.077  0.502  0  Bhutan  0.095  0.809**  -0.125  -0.310  -0.011 
Chma  -0.229  -0.543  -0.018  0.334  0.135  0  China  0.184  0.234  0.072  0.344  -0.139 
Korea  -0.038  -0.453*  0.092  0.519**  0.758  0  Korea  -0.00  0.179  0.061  0.102  0.213 
India  0.184**  0.432**  0.053  -0.054  0.525  0  India  0.085  0.787**  -0.117  -0.265  -0.023 
Indonesia  -0.049  -0.115  0.122  -0.024  0.120  3  Indonesia  0.014  0.018  0.016  -0.015  0.143 
Malaysia  0.111 *  0.124  0.056  -0.078  0.369  8  Malaysia  0.081  0.122  0.026  0.132  0.250 
Pakistan  0.106*  0.135  0.055  -0.012  0.294  0  Pakistan  0.155**  0.543**  -.106**  -.399**  0.540 
Philippines  -0.004  -0.052  -0.064  -0.019  0.035  0  Philippines  0.043  0.313  -0.210*  -.678**  0.203 
Singapore  0.119*  0.158  0.126**  -0.014  0.409  0  Singapore  0.211 **  0.183**  0.096**  0.084  0.658 
Sri Lanka  0.098  0.252  0.004  0.097  0.355  0  Sri Lanka  0.058  0.129*  0.020  -0.080  0.320 
Thailand  0.057**  0.073*  0.125**  0.028  0.760  0  Thailand  0.075**  0.048**  0.103**  .070**  0.946 
*Significantly¢. 0 at 10%.  **Significantly"¢- 0 at 5%.  Source: author's calculations based on IFS data. 
( 1) highest order of  autocorrelation of  residuals (k =  0 to 12) at 5% (Breusch-Godfrey test). 
E  f  23b  ,qua Ion 
1974:05-1978:10  1978:11-1985:02 
Country  C(O)  C(l)  R2  kliJ  Country  C(O)  C(l)  R2  k\IJ 
Bhutan  0.096  0.407**  0.283  0  Bhutan  0.203**  0.035  0.248  0 
China  0.283  0.435  0.081  0  China  0.371**  0.014  0.472  0 
Korea  Constant USD peg 1975:01 to 1979:12  Korea  0.073  0.032  0.245  12 
India  0.096  I 0.407  1 o.283  1  0  India  0.179**  0.085  0.345  0 
Indonesia  USD peg unti11978:10  Indonesia  0.037  -0.159  0.044  3 
Malaysia  o.323**  1  0.281  1 o.u2 1  9  Malaysia  0.315  0.229  0.592  0 
Pakistan  USD peg until  1981:12  Pakistan  0.153**  0.180  0.363  0 
Philippines  0.013  0.189**  0.238  11  Philippines  -0.262  -0.326  -0.035  0 
Singapore  0.256**  0.214  0.160  12  Singapore  0.350**  0.346**  0.742  0 
Sn Lanka  -0  154  -0.220  0.301  0  Sri Lanka  0.040  -0.115  0.185  0 
l'hailanJ  0.0 15**  0.026**  0.317  3  Thailand  -0.009  0.059  -0.059  0 
1985:03-1990:04  1990:05-1995:05 
Country  C(O)  C(l)  R2  k(l)  Country  C(O)  C(l)  R2  kliJ 
Bhutan  0.198**  0.131  0.283  0  Bhutan  -0.059  0.227  -0.084  0 
Chma  -0.197  -0.063  0.134  0  China  0.272  0.705  -0.086  0 
Korea  0.071 **  0.653**  0.757  0  Korea  0.050**  0.158  0.224  0 
India  0.174**  0.160  0.361  0  India  -0.070  0.292  -0.082  0 
Indonesia  0.096  0.100  0.157  0  Indonesia  0.019  -0.005  -0.006  0 
Malaysia  0.131**  0.030  0.356  8  Malaysia  0.090*  0.411 **  0.256  0 
Pakistan  0.127**  0.094  0.278  0  Pakistan  0.024  0.100  0.294  0 
Philippines  -0.076*  -0.042  0.019  l  Philippines  -0.095  -0.477  0.146  0 
Singapore  0.211 **  0.066  0.410  0  Singapore  0.207**  0.170*  0.388  0 
Sri Lanka  0.064  0.165**  0.347  0  Sri Lanka  0.107  0.105  0.224  0 
Thailand  0.166**  0.109*  0.777  11  Thailand  0.137**  0.115**  0.795  0 
* Stgmficantly "¢- 0 at 10%.  **Significantly"¢- 0 at 5%.  Source: author's calculations based on IFS data. 
( 1) highest order of  autocorrelation of  residuals (k =  0 to 12) at 5% (Breusch-Godfrey test). 
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0 Annex 4: Real monetary zones 
US dollar zone 
1974-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
OECD  United-States  United-States  United-States  United-States 
Canada  Canada  Canada  Canada 
Finland  Finland  Finland  Finland 
Norway  Norway  Norway  Norway 
Sweden  Sweden  Sweden  Sweden 
Turkey  France 
Australia  Australia  Australia  Australia 
LATIN AMERICA  Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia  Colombia  Colombia 
Ecuador 
Paraguay  Paraguay 
Venezuela  Venezuela  Venezuela  Venezuela 
Costa Rica  Costa-Rica  Costa-Rica 
Mexico 
El Salvador  El Salvador  El Salvador 
ASIA  Korea  Korea 
India  India 
Indonesia  Indonesia  Indonesia 
Malaysia  Malaysia 
Pakistan  Pakistan 
Philippines  Philippines  Philippines  Philippines 
Singapore  Singapore  Singapore  Singapore 
Sri-Lanka  Sri-Lanka  Sri-Lanka 
Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand 
AFRICA  Ghana  Ghana 
Marocco 
MIDDLE-EAST  Egypt 
Iran 
Israel  Israel  Israel 
Kuwait  Kuwait  Kuwait 
DMzone 
1974-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
EC  Germany  Germany  Germany  Germany 
Belgium  Belgium  Belgium  Belgium 
Denmark  Denmark  Denmark  Denmark 
France  France  France 
Ireland  Ireland  Ireland  Ireland 
Netherlands  Netherlands  Netherlands  Netherlands 
United-Kingdom  United-Kingdom 
OTHER WEST  -EUR  Austria  Austria  Austria  Austria 
AFRICA  South Mrica 
Marocco 
MIDDLE-EAST  Egypt 
Iran 
Centr. and East. EUR.  Hungary 
Yen zone 
1974-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
OECD  Japan  Japan  Japan  Japan 
United Kingdom  United Kingdom 
ASIA  Pakistan 
AFRICA  South Mrica 
MIDDLE-EAST  Egypt 
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.. ./  ... 
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1974-78  1979-83  1984-88  1989-93 
EC  United Kingdom 
Spain  Spain  Spain  Spain 
France 
Greece  Greece  Greece  Greece 
Italy  Italy  Italy  Italy 
Switzerland  Switzerland  Switzerland  Switzerland 
OTHEROECD  Turkey 
LATIN AMERICA  Argentina  Argentina  Argentina 
Brazil  Brazil  Brazil 
Chile  Chile  Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador  Ecuador  Ecuador 
Paraguay  Paraguay 
Uruguay  Uruguay  Uruguay  Uruguay 
Costa-Rica 
Mexico  Mexico  Mexico 
El Salvador 
ASIA  Korea  Korea 
India  India 
Indonesia 
Pakistan 
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AFRICA  South Africa  South Africa 
Ghana  Ghana 
Marocco  Marocco 
MIDDLE-EAST  Egypt  Egypt 
Iran  Iran 
Israel 
Syria 
Centr. and East. EUR.  Poland 
Romania 
70 Annex 5: Unit root analysis 
1973-1993 
Three equations are estimated: 
p 
(1)  Lllii,j(t) =  pEi,;(t -1) + LrhL\Ei,j(t- h)+ ut 
h=l 
p 
(2)  Lllii,;(t) =  c + pEi,;(t -1) + LrhLllii,;(t-h)+ vt 
h=l 
p 
(3)  Llli .. (t) =  c + J3t + pE .. (t -1) + ""'yhL\E  .. (t-h)+ w  l,J  I,J  ~  1 0)  t 
h=l 
where p stands for the last significant lag (p :5 12) which is chosen by an optimising procedure; 
c is a constant and Ut, vt, wt are the residuals. We test whether p differs significantly from zero 
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. If it  does, than Ei,j  is  stationary (I(O)),  i.e.  it tends in 
the  long  run  to  return  to  its  past  level  (equation 1  ),  to  a  constant  (equation  2),  or to  an 
exogenous trend (equation 3  ).  In all three cases, currency i can be said to use j as a real anchor. 
Country  Real exchange rate /US$  Real exchan~e rate /DM  Real exchange rate /yen 
Equation  Lagsp  Concl.*  Equation  La~sp  Concl.*  Equation  Lagsp  Concl.* 
Germany  3  0  1(1)  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Japan  3  1  1(1)  1  8  1(0)  I  I  I 
Austria  3  0  1(1)  3  12  1(1)**  3  9  I(O) 
Belgium (I)  3  0  1(1)  3  10  1(1)  3  11  I(l) 
Derunark  3  0  I(l)  3  12  I(O)  3  5  I(O) 
Finland  3  9  I(l)  3  4  I(l)  3  3  1(1) 
France (3)  3  2  1(1)  3  12  1(1)  3  5  1(0) 
Ireland (I)  3  0  1(1)  3  3  I(l)  3  8  I(O) 
Italy  3  0  I(l)  3  1  I(l)  3  9  I(O) 
Greece  3  11  1(1)  3  6  1(1)  3  8  I(O)** 
Netherl.  3  0  I(l)  3  0  I(O)  3  0  1(1) 
Norway  3  0  I(l)  3  2  I(l)  3  5  I(O) 
Spain  3  0  1(1)  3  0  I(l)  3  8  I(O)** 
Sweden  3  9  1(1)  3  4  I(l)  3  11  1(1) 
Switzerland  3  0  I( 1)  3  1  l(O)  3  3  1(0) 
UK  3  1  l(l)  3  0  l(l)  2  10  I(O)** 
Australia  3  3  I  (I)  3  0  l(l)  3  1  1(1) 
Canada  3  lU  I( l)  3  0  1(1)  3  12  I(l) 
Turkey (2)  1  11  1(1)  3  9  1(1)  I(>l) 
India  3  0  1(1)  3  9  1(1)  2  12  1(1)** 
Indonesia  3  3  l(l)  3  0  I(l)  3  9  1(1) 
Korea  3  6  1(1)  3  0  I(l)  3  12  1(1) 
Pakistan  3  2  1(0)  3  1  1(1)  3  5  1(1) 
Philippines  3  10  1(0)  3  10  1(1)  3  5  1(0) 
SriLanka (4)  2  8  I(O)  3  12  I(l)  3  11  1(1) 
Thailand  3  2  1(1)  3  7  1(1)  3  5  1(1) 
*at lOo/o.  **Residuals auto-correlated. (1) until1992:12. (2) from 1986:01. (3) Computed with unit labor costs. 
(4) From 1976:01. (5) Untill990:12. (6) From 1975:01 to 1993:10. (8) From 1989:01. (9) From 1990:05. 
71 Country  Real exchange rate /US$  Real exchange rate /DM  Real exchange rate /yen 
Equation  Lagsp  Concl.*  Equation  Lagsp  Concl.*  Equation  Lagsp  Concl.* 
Argent. (5)  3  12  1(0)  3  11  1(1)  3  11  1(1) 
Brazil (S)  3  6  1(1)  3  6  1(0)  3  12  1(0) 
Chile  3  5  I( 1)  3  0  1(1)  3  8  1(1)** 
Colombia  3  8  1(1)  3  0  1(1)  3  12  1(1) 
Costa-Rica  3  9  1(0)  3  6  1(1)  3  9  1(0) 
Ecuador (6)  3  7  1(1)  3  0  1(1)  3  0  1(1) 
El Salvador  3  0  1(1)  3  0  1(1)  3  0  1(1) 
Mexico  3  4  1(1)  3  6  1(0)  3  4  1(1) 
Venezuela  3  0  1(0)  3  1  1(1)  3  1  1(1) 
South-Afr.  2  12  1(0)**  3  8  1(1)  3  8  1(1) 
Poland (8)  3  1  1(1)  3  1  1(1)  3  0  1(1)** 
Romania (9)  3  0  1(1)  3  0  1(1)  3  0  1(1) 
*at 10%. **Residuals auto-correlated. (1) until1992:12. (2) from 1986:01. (3) Computed with unit labor costs. 
(4) From 1976:01. (5) Until1990:12. (6) From 1975:01 to 1993:10. (8) From 1989:01. (9) From 1990:05. 
72 Annex 7: Cointegration analysis, 1974-1993 
Cointegration tests are carried out in order to find long-run relationships between each i/$ real 
exchange rate (Ei,s)  and  the DM/$ real exchange rate (EoMs)  or the yen/$ real exchange rate 
(Evs).  DM/$ and  Y/$  real  exchange rates are I(l), so  this test is  run  only for I(l) i/$  real 
exchange rates.  The test consists in  looking whether a linear combination of Ei,s  and  EoM,s 
(resp. Ev,s) is stationary, i.e. I(O). Using the Engle-Granger (1987) method, we regress: 
E 1,1(t) = c + J,EDM,s(t) + z(t) 
Then, the stationarity of  the residuals z(t) is tested using an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test like the one presented in annex 4.  If z(t) is stationary, then Ei,s  and EoM,s are cointegrated 
and  'A  is the cointegrating coefficient.  The same method is used for cointegration between Ei,s 
and Ev.s. 
Cointegration tests are carried out over the whole 1973-1993 period for I( I) curencies 
1
. 
Country i  Cointegration between £. s and EDM s  Cointegration between £. s and Ey s 
Lagsp  ADF  A  Lagsp  ADF  A 
Germany  6  -3.47*  1.135 
Japan  6  -3.79*  0.626 
Austria  8  -3.63*  0.924  5  -3.71*  1.041 
Belgium (I)  9  -3.47*  0.929  11  -2.78  1.046 
Denmark  3  -3.37  0.895  7  -3.17  0.995 
Finland  12  -3.08  0.610  6  -2.40  0.628 
France (3)  11  -2.37  0.803  7  -3.48*  0.868 
Ireland (I)  7  -2.58  0.749  3  -3.34  0.888 
Italy  3  -1.98  0.918  6  -3.08  0.979 
Greece  3  -2.48  0.718  6  -2.66  0.771 
Nether  I.  3  -3.54*  1.039  6  -3.15  1.183 
Norway  3  -2.57  0.771  6  -2.98  0.847 
Spam  3  -2.04  0.910  7  -2.99  0.950 
Swt:den  3  -2.29  0.829  5  -2.78  0.883 
S\\>11Lerland  5  -3. 72*  0.909  5  -3.87*  1.100 
UK  3  -2.67  0.592  5  -2.68  0.661 
India  3  -2.71  -0.050  3  -2.55  0.040 
Indonesia  2  -2.58  -0.213  2  -2.70  0.301 
Korea  2  -1.86  0.199  2  -1.62  0.199 
Thailand  3  -2.37  0.292  3  -3.03  0.313 
Singapore  3  -2.58  0.063  3  -2.65  -0.004 
Australia  3  -2.82  0.321  3  -2.40  0.348 
Canada  12  -2.55  0.167  12  -2.53  0.172 
Turkey (2)  4  -1.85  0.402  3  -3.60  -0.521 
Brazil (5)  8  -2.97  0.608  7  -2.70  0.571 
Chile  3  -2.46  0.013  3  -2.44  -0.028 
Colombia  3  -1.68  -0.323  12  -2.69  -0.389 
Ecuador(6)  2  -1.94  -0.082  2  -1.91  -0.144 
El Salvador  3  -2.83  -0.671  4  -2.67  -0.739 
Mexico  8  -2.90  0.338  8  -2.47  0.360 
* 10% rejection of  the nul hypothesis of  no cointegration. 
(1) until1992:12. (2) from 1986:01. (3) Computed with unit labor costs. (4) From 1976:01. 
(5) Until1990:12. (6) From 1975:01 to 1993:10. (8) From 1989:01. (9) From 1990:05. 
CEECs arc not concerned since the corresponding series are too short and submitted to the large initial shock. 
73 Annex 8: A simple portfolio approach to exchange rate fluctuations 
Let there be two countries called A and B. Let FA( t) be the currency A value of  net holdings of 
country A denominated in currency Bat timet, and Fs(t) the currency B value of  net holdings 
of  country Bin currency A at timet. S(t) is the nominal, bilateral exchange rate, defined as the 
price of  currency B in terms of  currency A. B  A( t) is the bilateral current account of  country A. 
The bilateral balance of  payments can be written in terms of  country A's currency: 
The exchange rate is normalised so as S(t-1)=1. Taking the bilateral expected yield differential 
and expected risk as constant, the optimal share of  foreign assets in the net wealth of  each 
country is also constant: 
(4.2) 
with Wi: net wealth of  country i (i=A,B). In the short run, the net wealth is constant. The 
balance of  payments can be re-written (dropping time arguments): 
Thus we have: 
Currency A depreciates (S rises) when country A runs a current account deficit ( BA  < 0 ). 
This depreciation makes B-denominated assets more valuable. Assuming that the optimal 
allocation of  net wealth remains constant, country A asset-holders sell B-denominated assets, 
and country B asset-holders buy A-denominated assets. Both movements are stabilising since 
they entail an inflow of  capital to country A. Nevertheless, the stabilising effect depends on 
whether there are one or two international currencies, and it also depends on the net initial 
positions of  both countries. 
First case: only A has an international currency (kA=O,  ks  :~; 0). 
All net foreign assets of  country A are denominated in its own currency. Thus they are 
aggregated in Fs as net liabilities of  country Bin A's currency, and all net foreign assets of 
country Bare A-denominated. Equation (4.4) becomes (4.5): 
74 Suppose the net external positions are initially close to balance. Because there is only one 
international currency, the net holdings of  country Bin A's currency are close to zero 
(kB  ~  0). In case country A runs a deficit, the depreciation of  its currency has a very low 
stabilising effect, because it hardly affects the net position of  country B in currency A: the 
exchange rate fluctuations will be very large. 
Now if  the net external position of  country A is strongly negative, the net holdings of  country 
B in currency A are strongly positive, and the exchange rate fluctuations will be small 
(k8  >> 0). 
Lastly, if the net external position of  country A is positive, that of  country B is negative, and 
the exchange rate adjustment is destabilising ( k  B  < 0 ): if  A runs a deficit, its currency must 
appreciate in order to equilibrate the balance of  payments. 
Second case: both countries are international (k  A ,kB  -:t 0). 
The net external position of  each country can now be different from its net holdings in the 
foreign currency. 
Suppose the net external positions are initially close to balance. kA and ka can be both positive 
or both negative. Generally they will be both positive, meaning that the currency diversification 
is larger for assets than for liabilities. Thus exchange rate fluctuations will be relatively small. 
Now if  the initial net external position of  country A is strongly negative, kA will be negative 
while ka will be positive, meaning that country B has a positive external position in both 
currencies. In case country A runs a current account deficit, the depreciation of  currency A has 
two opposite effects: 
(i) country B's holdings in currency A depreciate, which leads to a stabilising inflow of  capital 
into currency A; 
(ii) country A's debt in currency B is re-valued, which leads to a destabilising flow of  capital 
out of  country A, asset holders ofB wanting to reduce the share of  currency B in their 
portfolios. 
This second effect increases exchange rate instability. 
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